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INTRODUCTION

More than three decades ago, the War on Poverty ushered in a
wave of thinking and activity about the problem of poverty in America.
It gave birth to a new set of institutions and practices, which included a
significant number of innovations concerning the provision of legal
services to the poor. The government-funded Legal Services Corporation, a nonprofit, public-interest law firm and the practice of "impact"
litigation are among the now familiar legacies of this period. It was a
time of significant success and even greater optimism concerning the
instrumental use of the law to bring about social change on behalf of the
poorest segments of American society.
More recently, after a decade in which the gap between rich and
poor in America has widened dramatically and practitioners of poverty
law have encountered repeated setbacks, one may see in an emerging
wave of literature the elements of a nascent rebirth of the practice of law
for poor people.I Although this emerging literature cannot be described
as a movement, there are important elements that are common to the
variously described as "critical lawyering," 2
approaches that have been
"rebellious lawyering," 3 "the theoretics of practice," 4 and "the new public interest law."5 In their focus on the practice of lawyering over legal
doctrine, their emphasis on narrative over exposition, and their attempts
to reinscribe the client as an active participant in lawyer/client decisionmaking, these new scholars call for a dramatic departure from much of
the "traditional" poverty law practice and scholarship.
The subject of this Article is the evolution over the last thirty years
of the theories of the practice of poverty law.6 This Article examines
that evolution through the prism of contemporary scholarly debates in
which the critiques of the new scholars are pitted against the experience
and commitment of the older practitioners. 7 These debates are mislead1. See infra notes 2-5.
2. Louise G. Trubek, CriticalLawyering: Toward a New Public Interest Practice, 1 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 49 (1991).
3. GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE
LAW PRACTICE

(1992).

4. Symposium, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive Thought and Action,
43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992).
S. Lois H. Johnson, The New Public Interest Law: From Old Theories to a New Agenda, I
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 169 (1991).
6. While the title of this article specifically refers to poverty law, it is not meant to exclude
other aspects of disempowerment which often affect poor clients, as well as clients who are not

poor. Issues of race, gender, sexual orientation, age, and nationality all intersect with, and are an
important part, of the practice of lawyering on behalf of disempowered groups. See Trubek, supra
note 2, at 54.
7. For two reasons, the focus of this article is on scholarship, rather than the practice of

lawyering for the disadvantaged. First, discourses about poverty lawyering, both within the
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ing for two reasons. First, they are constructed upon an artificial dichotomy between "new" and "old" lawyering approaches, which overlooks
or minimizes the ongoing struggles among practitioners and scholars.
Second, the process of comparing abstract models of lawyering removes
lawyering practices from the socio-historical and discursive contexts that
give them their meaning and utility. This Article is an attempt to deepen
the scholarly debate over different approaches to poverty lawyering by
examining in detail social, historical, and political conditions during the
two periods of scholarly proliferation on the subject. This Article also
explores constitutive struggles among scholars within each period. In
part, this is the continuation of a project that was begun with Louise
Trubek in an earlier paper, which will further articulate and contextualize what is called the "critical lawyering" vision.8 This Article, however, will attempt to take a more objective and nuanced view of both the
"old" approaches that are being critiqued and the "new" perspectives
that have generated these critiques.
The more "objective" view of this Article does, however, originate
from a particular place. I write primarily from the perspective of a
scholar, not a practitioner, and of a member of the generation which
came of age in the eighties, not the sixties. My view of these debates is
necessarily reflected through the prism of these important features of my
own historical and disciplinary location. 9 Influenced by a general shift
in social theory away from hard and fast distinctions between subjects
and objects, structures and agents, theory and practice,10 I was originally
attracted to the new scholarship by its claims to challenge the theory/
practice divide in legal scholarship. Reading and reflecting on these
texts, I came to the conclusion that both the new and the old approaches
to poverty law theory are framed by oppositional ways of thinking about
lawyering community and in society at large, are a powerful force in shaping how poverty
lawyers, policy makers, and poor clients conceive of the possibilities and limitations of this type
of lawyering work, and consequently how it is practiced. Second, while there has recently been a

proliferation of writing that thoughtfully addresses many of the difficult issues inherent in the
practice of poverty law, the relationship between academic work and poverty law practice has

remained a largely unexplored and contentious terrain.
8. Ruth M. Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and
PracticalLook at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. 687 (1992).

9. Pierre Bourdieu emphasizes the importance of subjecting the position of the observer to
the same critical scrutiny as the object of study. He calls this process "reflexivity." A good
discussion of Bourdieu's notion of "reflexivity" is contained in PIERRE BouRDIEU & LoIc J.D.
36-46 (1992).
10. A further elaboration of the theoretical orientation of my approach is found in the
Postscript, infra part V. On the effects of "harmful antinomies," see Pierre Bourdieu, Vive la
Crise! For Heterodoxy in Social Science, 17 THEORY & Soc'Y 773 (1988). On a general
epistemic shift, see Sherry B. Ortner, Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties, 26 COMP. STuD.
Soc'Y & HIST. 126 (1984).
WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY,
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structures and agents, society and individuals, subjects and objects, theory and practice. While there is important reconstructive potential for
poverty law scholarship in mounting a challenge to these old dichotomies, I now recognize that this task is much more complex, and must
take into consideration one's place in an evolving tradition of interconnected theories and practices regarding social change through law.
This perspective informs my understanding of what lawyers do as a
set of culturally constitutive practices. To say that lawyering is cultural
means simply that it is embedded in a panoply of interconnected social
and cultural practices. The legal arguments and strategies that are the
putative "objects" of the study of poverty lawyering cannot be disembedded from their context in the intentions and self-understandings of
the agents who deploy these objects. The legal arguments themselves
may bear traces of their use from a particular time and place, as the well
worn grooves on an old axe or butter chum reveal their pattern of use in
a different era. We must look beyond the tools themselves to their
deployment in a broader web of social relations in order to develop a
notion of the "practice" of lawyering, chopping wood, or churning butter
in a particular era.
I use the notion that law is constitutive in a dual sense, to describe
both a terrain or site in which social relations are produced and the agent
or instrument of that production and reproduction.l' First, the constitutive concept suggests that legal phenomena prefigure and determine the
landscape or terrain on which society effects social change. In this
sense, the notion of law as constitutive suggests that "the law is all
over." 2 We cannot escape the myriad ways in which legal norms and
institutions have figured in our discourse and our practices, even and
especially when we are trying to transform that discourse and those
practices. The second, related aspect of this idea is that law is a mechanism for the production of social relations. Legal rules do not merely
limit the range of available actions, they also are a means for reproducing norms, institutions, and relationships in society. For example, a particular set of legal rules and norms operate together to produce what is
commonly described as the "free" market, although the rules themselves
function to constrain some types of market activity while enabling
others. The practice of law, which largely consists of interpreting and
applying legal rules in particular circumstances for the benefit of clients,
both reproduces and subtly transforms the larger norms and institutions
11. See generally

ALAN

CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW

HUNT, EXPLORATIONS
(1993).

IN

LAW

AND

SociErY:

TOWARD A

12. Austin Sarat, "... The Law is All Over": Power, Resistance, and the Legal
Consciousnessof the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990).
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of which those legal rules are a part. In this way, lawyering practices are
both a mechanism for the reproduction of social institutions, and a site
where they may be transformed.
Finally, the notion of lawyering as practice also conveys an important duality. On one hand, it emphasizes the corporeality of lawyering;
lawyering always takes place in a particular location and point in time.
It is invariably contextual and specific. The tactics and strategies that
might work for one client with a particular legal problem may be very
different from those that were successful for a different client the week
before. Lawyering as practice also suggests that lawyering involves
skills that can be developed through experience. This provides for a
degree of deference to those who have accumulated knowledge about
poverty law, while at the same time it subverts the idea that there can be
one "right" way of lawyering.
This way of thinking about poverty lawyering acknowledges its
role as a meaning-making activity. It attempts to reinscribe the meaning
of a client's experience of disempowerment upon the structure of acceptable legal arguments and strategies. Because of its experimental and
practical qualities, its contextualized and improvisational nature, lawyering is more akin to cooking than to mathematics, more art than science.
This discussion concerning the cultural, constitutive, and meaningmaking aspects of lawyering practice provides the basis for this Article's
thesis concerning the importance of "context" in debates about the usefulness of law for social transformation. Social change lawyering is not
static; it changes over time. Whether certain lawyering practices are
enabling or disempowering, or whether they transform or reinforce the
status quo, are not questions that can be discussed meaningfully without
reference to a complex web of social, political, and cultural norms that
situate and give meaning to a set of practices in a particular place and
time. Therefore, the study of lawyering practices reveals a site in which
the meaning and usefulness of legal strategies is constantly being reproduced and redefined. While closely connected to the numerous debates
regarding the connections between legal and social change, ranging
along a spectrum that includes the CLS critique of legal ideology, 13 the
social science challenge to the utility of litigation strategies as a mechanism for social change, 14 and more radical, postmodern approaches

13. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: CriticalLegal Theory and Local Social

Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 685 (1985); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's
Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 209 (1979); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73
CAL. L. REv. 1151 (1985).
14. See infra note 29.
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which reject the transformative potential of legal discourse altogether,15
the critique of legal practice is a relatively uncharted territory. The discovery and exploration of this realm is both the particular accomplishment and the challenge of poverty law scholarship. 6
II.

THE OLD AND THE NEW:

A

DEBATE

This Section addresses a debate within the poverty lawyering community concerning a perceived shift in the nature and emphasis of our
scholarship. The debate contrasts new poverty law scholarship with
more familiar approaches from an earlier period of poverty advocacy
and lawyering. Joel Handler's 1972 Presidential Address to the Law and
Society Association 7 is an example of one way that discussions over the
use of law for social change have been framed. Handler questions the
value of "postmodern" approaches to theorizing for a transformative
politics. Although he is imprecise about what he includes under the
rubric of "postmodern, '"'8 at least some of the new poverty lawyering
scholarship clearly falls within the category with which he is
concerned.'

9

Handler frames his discussion as a comparison of a number of stories of "protest from below" dating from the 1950s and 1960s with stories from what he calls the "postmodern era." On the basis of this
comparison, he criticizes the "postmoderns" for at least three moves that
he thinks are inconsistent with the needs and aims of a "progressive
15. See, e.g., Kristen Bumiller, Body Images: How Does the Body Matter in the Legal
Imagination (June 1993) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
16. The study of social practices poses a unique challenge for theory, which has commonly
been confined to the analysis of discourse. See MICIHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF
EVERYDAY LIFE (Steven F. Rendall trans., 1984).
A particular problem arises when, instead of being a discourse on other discourses,
as is usually the case, theory has to advance over an area where there are no longer
any discourses. There is a sudden unevenness of terrain: the ground on which
verbal language rests begins to fail. The theorizing operation finds itself at the
limits of the terrain where it normally functions, like an automobile at the edge of a
cliff. Beyond and below lies the ocean.
Id. at 61.
17. Joel Handler, Postmodernism, Protest and the New Social Movements, 26 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 697 (1992). Handler is by no means the worst offender, or the best example of this
resistance. These issues have also been debated at the Interuniversity Consortium on Poverty
Law. See Gary Blasi, What's a Theory For? Notes on Reconstructing Poverty Law Scholarship,
48 U. MiAMi L. REV. 1063 (1994); Louise G. Trubek, Lawyering for Poor People: Revisionist
Scholarship and Practice,48 U. MiAMi L. Rsv. 983 (1994).
18. For a serious indictment of this failing, see Steven Winter, Cursing the Darkness, 48 U.
MiAMi L. Rav. 1115 (1994).
19. See, e.g., Handler, supra note 17, at 712 (discussing Lucie E. White, Subordination,
Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing ofMrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REv.
1 (1990)).
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politics." According to Handler, the new theories: 1) celebrate the subversion of dominant discourse and resist the construction of alternative
meta-narratives that might animate progressive social action; 2) focus on
isolated and individualized stories of resistance rather than collective
struggles; and 3) are disabled by pessimism about the possibility for
wide-scale social transformation.
Handler contrasts this view of the "new" approach with selected
examples from the 1950s and 1960s that focus on collective struggles,
and speak optimistically about community building, cooperative networks of resistance and institutional transformation. Handler measures
the old approaches against the new approaches on the basis of the scale
of their social analysis, their instrumentalism, and the degree of optimism that they inspire. He finds the postmoderns to be lacking on all
counts.
Handler's critique of the new approaches exemplifies a particular
type of resistance that is being encountered by the new generation of
poverty law scholars as they try to make their work known beyond their
immediate colleagues and outside the walls of their law school clinics.
This resistance presumes that the new approaches, because they are critical of aspects of traditional poverty lawyering practice, fail to acknowledge the value of what poverty advocates have done for the past thirty
years. Rather than confronting the new scholars' observations about the
limitations of traditional advocacy approaches in dealing with contemporary issues, Handler and others have issued a nostalgic call for
renewed optimism in instrumental approaches and large-scale social
transformation. Rather than acknowledging that the changing social,
economic, and intellectual climate demands new responses from poverty
lawyers, these scholars want to return poverty lawyering to an idealized
model of its 1960s heyday.
On the other hand, proponents of the new approaches have not
spent much time acknowledging their debts to the generation of advocates that preceded them. The critiques of traditional poverty lawyering,
which began to proliferate in the 1980s, rarely reflexively situated themselves at a particular historical and social juncture. The critics rarely
observed that useful and appropriate advocacy approaches will vary with
the circumstances, or they failed to apply those observations specifically
to the poverty advocacy of the previous generation. A narrow focus on
professional norms and legal discourse too easily obscures the influence
of the larger social context in which they are embedded. In this way, the
criticisms of Handler and others that new poverty advocates have lost
sight of the forest for the trees appear to have some degree of truth.
Articles that focus on the dismantling of lawyer/client hierarchies rarely
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discuss larger-scale strategies for social transformation; 20 those that discuss "interpretive violence" obscure the severity and commonality of
real violence in poor peoples' lives; 21 and those that examine poor people's consciousness of the law as a mechanism of their disempowerment
are unlikely to provide suggestions about the use of law as a tool for
social change.22
As I suggested in my introduction, I think that the new versus old
debate, exemplified by Handler, is misleading in the way that it frames
the difficult issues faced by poverty law scholars. That debate leads
advocates of both the old and new approaches to speak about lawyering
practices as if they were severable from the social, political and institutional discourses and practices within which they are embedded. This
acontextual and ahistorical approach has led to an impoverished view of
theory on both sides. The limitations and discontinuities between the
new and old approaches have been overemphasized, while many significant matters of congruence and continuity have been obscured.
There are three challenges presently facing poverty law scholarship: to study and understand the tradition of theory and practice concerning lawyering for the poor in all of its complex and sometimes
contradictory aspects; to identify the new challenges for poverty law
practitioners and scholars that arise out of the significant social and cultural transformations that have occurred in the past three decades; and to
provide creative suggestions for addressing specific problems and issues
in the future, drawing on a reconstructed understanding of the tools at
hand.
This Article addresses the first two of those aims. It explores
important elements of both continuity and difference in poverty law
scholarship by reconnecting theories about poverty law to the contexts in
which they were developed.23 While I see this Article as engaging in a
process of "excavation" by unearthing suppressed perspectives and overlooked similarities among two generations of poverty law scholars, I
also hope that it will provide the basis for reconstruction, by providing a
broader historical and theoretical foundation upon which to build future
approaches to thinking and writing about poverty lawyering and
practice.
A number of enduring themes can be identified in poverty lawyering scholarship since the early sixties. They are the issues and dilemmas
20. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn: The Story of Josephine V., 4 GEO. J.
619 (1991); White, supra note 19.
21. Lucie E. White, Paradox,Piecework and Patience,43 HAsTrNGs L.J. 853 (1992).
22. See, e.g., Sarat, supra note 12, at 343.
23. For a discussion that expands on the theoretical significance of "context," see Martha
Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1597 (1990).
LEGAL ETHICS
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over which the constitutive struggles of this field of scholarship have
been fought. Those themes concern the need to confront disempowerment both at the level of institutions and individuals, the need to appreciate the law's double role as a tool for social change as well as for the
reproduction of hierarchies, and the need for belief in the possibility of
change through law as well as an understanding of its serious limitations. I have framed these issues in terms of three constitutive tensions:
in analysis, between scope and specificity; in strategy, between the identification of law as tool or terrain; and in outlook, between the need for
hope and humility.
A.

Scope/Specificity

Scope, as used in this Article, refers to approaches and methods of
analysis that help us to "get at" institutionalized regimes of power, for
example large scale social subordination like racism, sexism, and
bureaucratic disentitlement. Scope refers to collective experiences of
disempowerment and collective struggles. Specificity refers to individual moments of resistance. It emphasizes the need to be attentive to
particular instances of disempowerment, which may too easily be erased
by or subsumed into the larger stories of oppression. Specificity is the
counterweight to the simplifying and reductive tendencies of macrolevel theories of social transformation; it is the countervailing tendency
to scope.
While they produce very different outlooks, it is also important to
recognize the extent to which scope and specificity are interrelated.
Broad-based mechanisms of power are composed of many particularized
instances of oppression; conversely, these larger forces are also inherent
in any particular instance of social subordination.
The scope/specificity theme reveals one of the enduring dilemmas
of poverty lawyering: how to design one's advocacy to bring about
social change that is both meaningful, in the sense that it may change the
lives of some poor people, and significant, in that it may also bring
about changes in the social institutions that create and reproduce
poverty.
The scope/specificity dilemma is also at the heart of a central
debate in public policy toward the poor. The issue of where to attribute
blame for the misfortune of poor people, whether on themselves or on
society as a whole, has long been an obsession of social policy and a
battleground for debates over the "deservingness" of the poor to the benefits, including legal services, to which they are entitled in the welfare
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state.24 This debate over whether poor people are lazy and immoral or
merely lack social opportunities is an example of how complex social
dilemmas are misleadingly reduced to a simple question of structural
versus individual responsibility. This type of simplistic dichotomizing
makes for unproductive, and sometimes harmful, discourse." Acknowledging that both specific and large-scale forms of disempowerment need
to be understood at the same time, and as part of the same social phenomenon, ends the argument over blame while giving rise to a new,
multi-dimensional way of looking at these problems.
B.

Tools/Terrain

The question of whether the law is a tool of social change or a
terrain of struggle occurs primarily in the realm of strategies and tactics
to be deployed by poverty lawyers. On one hand, it is possible to view
the law as a tool-a weapon-something that can be wielded on behalf
of the poor as well as the powerful. This metaphor spawned many
famous legal campaigns for social change,26 including the civil rights
struggle which resulted in Brown v. Board of Education7 and the abortion rights campaign which led to Roe v. Wade.28 This metaphor also
has given rise to an entire body of literature devoted to assessing, measuring, and debating the usefulness of law as an instrument of social
transformation.29
Despite the obvious power of the idea of the law as a weapon in the
fight for social change, this idea has also been the subject of much criticism. Many have pointed out the tendency of the legal weapon to backfire, leading to co-optation, stasis, and even a greater reinforcement of
social inequities. Instead, these critics tend to emphasize the nature of
law as a preexisting aspect of all social relations, a fundamentally
skewed playing field or terrain of struggle. They see social relations and
social subjects as constructs of pregiven social contexts. Legal ideas and
legal categories are a fundamental part of this ongoing process of social
24. See generally MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY
TO THE WAR ON WELFARE (1989).
25. For an expanded discussion of how these ways of thinking about poverty have informed
our social and legal rhetoric, see Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our

Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499 (1991).
26. These two examples are discussed at length in GERALD N.

ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW

HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).

27. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA
NEW YORK (1976); MICHAEL W. McCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON
PUBLIC INTEREST LIBERALISM (1986); ROSENBERG, supra note 26; STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE
POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974).
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construction. Of course, the problem with the "social constructivist"

view is that it does not provide a way of thinking about how things
might change, or how agents might act to change them, outside of their
socially constructed natures.
C.

Hope/Humility

The attitude with which advocates approach their work is represented by the final category, hope/humility. Hope is simply one's belief

in the efficacy of social change through law. Without hope, it is difficult
to imagine any poverty lawyering at all. It seems necessary for advocates to maintain their faith in the usefulness of their work, to connect
their everyday experiences with some vision of a better world, in order
to maintain energy and commitment. When advocates lose faith in the
possibility of change, we describe it as "burn-out. ' 30 The 1980s was a
period of high bum-out, and correspondingly low faith in the possibility
of change through law. On the other hand, too much hope on the part of
public interest lawyers can lead to lawyer-driven decisions made by
advocates unable or unwilling to learn from their clients or other
advocates.
Humility is a necessary counterweight to the hubris to which enthusiastic "social engineers" can too easily fall prey. 31 The quality of
humility allows an appreciation for the limitations of one's own perspectives, efforts, and ability to accomplish the changes sought. It encourages practitioners to collaborate with others, to listen, and to learn as
they go along. It allows advocates to be encouraged by, and to build on,
incremental changes and isolated moments of resistance. Humility
allows more space for the empowerment of clients within the advocacy
process, even as it limits expectations about outcome.3 2
As Patricia Williams reminds us, "[t]hat life is complicated is a fact
of great analytic importance. ' 33 Poverty lawyering scholarship needs
30. For a phenomenological account of "burn-out" among public interest lawyers of the
1980s, see Peter Gabel, Dukakis 's Defeat and the Transformative Possibilitiesof Legal Culture, 4
Tixxaut 13 (1989).
3 1. Anthony Cook invokes the notion of humility in a parallel effort at reconstructive theory
which seeks to build upon the work of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. See Anthony E. Cook,
Reflections on Postmodernism, 26 NEw ENG. L. REv. 751, 771 (1992) ("We are in need of the
humility that tempers our encounter with others even as it inspires our vision for all.").
32. Cornel West described a similar tension when he spoke of the need to "carve out a
democratic left in the space between the Scylla of upbeat liberalism that harbors excessive hopes
for the law and the Charybdis of downbeat leftism that promotes exorbitant doubts about the law."
Comel West, The Role of Law in ProgressivePolitics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 468, 468 (David
Kairys ed. 1991).
33. PATRICIA WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 10 (1991).

The remainder of the

paragraph eloquently completes the insight:
Law too often seeks to avoid this truth by making up its own breed of narrower,
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stories that account for the richness and multiplicity of poor people's
experiences as well as broad-ranging narratives of social power and
transformation. We need to think strategically about how the law can be
used as a tool for social change while recognizing its role in the
marginalization and disempowerment of certain groups of people. We
also need to think about how to approach the tasks of social transformation with both hope and humility. These dilemmas illuminate the enormous difficulties at the center of poverty lawyering in any era, and
should complicate the following discussion of the two generations of
poverty law scholarship.

III.

POVERTY LAW IN THE SIXTIES REVISITED

While the notion of legal aid for the poor has been around almost as
long as the legal profession, the decade of the 1960s marked a period of
substantial invigoration and of the flourishing of efforts to use law to
transform society on behalf of the disadvantaged. While some of the
innovations of the period, like the law communes, have failed to survive,
many of the ideas and institutions that now form the basis for the provision of legal services to the poor and for the use of law to address social
inequities originated during the 1960s. 34 The story of the development
of ideas about law and social change, from the early work of the
National Association For the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
and the Legal Defense Fund (LDF) to the establishment of the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO) Legal Services program and the innovation and spread of the free-standing public interest law firm, is beyond
the scope of this Article. In my review of this decade's poverty law
scholarship, I am mostly interested in elements from poverty law's past
which continue to shape the thinking and writing about the practice of
poverty lawyering today, as well as those perspectives that seem to have
been lost or submerged in the intervening decades. 3" My analysis is
simpler, but hypnotically powerful rhetorical truths. Acknowledging, challenging,
playing with these as rhetorical gestures is, it seems to me, necessary for any
conception of justice. Such acknowledgement complicates the supposed purity of
gender, race, voice, boundary; it allows us to acknowledge the utility of such
categorizations for certain purposes and the necessity of their breakdown on other
occasions. It complicates definitions in its shift, in its expansion and contraction
according to circumstance, in its room for the possibility of creatively mated
taxonomies and their wildly unpredictable offspring.
Id.
34. A description of some of the law communes, as well as a number of popular and lesser
known radical lawyers, is found in MARLISE JAMEs, THE PEOPLE'S LAWYERS (1973).
35. I make no attempt to provide an institutional history of poverty lawyering, although such
a history needs to be written. Rather, this article is a conceptual "history of the present" in
poverty lawyering scholarship. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in
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based on a small but representative sample of frequently cited scholarship by and about poverty law advocates published during that time.36
A.

Social Context

My review of the scholarship has led me to two distinct "stories"
that seemed greatly significant both in the 1960s, when new ideas and
practices were created for using the law to benefit the economically disadvantaged, and in contemporary thought and practice in the field. The
events focused on here are the creation of the Legal Services Corpora-

tion in the first part of the 1960s as a part of the War on Poverty, and the
Welfare Rights Movement, which began in the second half of the decade
and continued into the 1970s.
1.

THE WAR ON POVERTY

Commentators have observed that social attention to questions of
equity and the problems of the poor in this country has been cyclical.
The War on Poverty marks one point at which poverty was rediscovered
as a social problem, an "episode in the recurring dialectic of reform and

reaction that punctuates American history.

'37

In 1964, Congress passed

the Economic Opportunity Act, which was the cornerstone of this mul-

tifaceted governmental attack on the economic disenfranchisement of a
LANGUAGE, COUNTERMEMORY, PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS (Donald Bouchard
ed. 1977).
36. My sources are drawn from among the numerous articles on poverty lawyering published
in the 1960s and 1970s. I have endeavored to select authors and pieces that were instrumental in
shaping the perspectives and attitudes toward poverty lawyering at the time. I realize, however,
that my assessment of this may differ from others'. The articles on which I have relied in piecing
together this brief genealogy are: Edgar S. Cahn & Jean C. Cal, Power to the People or the
Profession?-ThePublic Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005 (1970); Edgar S.
Cahn & Jean C. Cal, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964);
Jerome E. Carlin & Jan Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
381 (1965); Charles R. Halpern & John M. Cunningham, Reflections on the New Public Interest
Law: Theory and Practiceat the Centerfor Law and Social Policy, 59 GEO. L.J. 1095 (1971);
Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7 (1969); Charles A. Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 771 (1964); Edward V. Sparer, The Role of the Welfare Client's Lawyer,
12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 361 (1965); Harry P. Stumpf, Law and Poverty: A Political Perspective,
Wis. L. REv. 694 (1968); Comment, The New PublicInterest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069 (1970).
Several books were also of assistance: JOEL HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SoCIAL CHANGE (1978); JAMES, supra note 34;
FRANCES F. PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS (1977); RADICAL

LAWYERS (J. Black ed. 1971). I have drawn upon recent sources including Rand Rosenblatt,
Legal Entitlement and Welfare Benefits, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 202 (David Kairys ed. 1982),
and the articles in Symposium, The Legacy ofGoldberg v. Kelly: A Twenty Year Perspective, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 729 (1990).
37. KATZ, supra note 24, at 4; see also JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA

(1976).
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significant segment of the American population. The Act's introduction
states:
The United States can achieve its full economic and social potential
as a nation only if every individual has the opportunity to contribute
to the full extent of his capabilities and to participate in the workings
of our society. It is, therefore, the policy of the United States to eliminate the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty in this Nation by
opening to everyone the opportunity . . . to live in decency and
dignity.3"

The Act created federally-funded antipoverty programs, such as
Head Start, the Job Corps, and Community Action Programs. In addition, preexisting, redistributive social programs such as Social Security,
Medicaid and Medicare, Aid for Families with Dependant Children
(AFDC), and food stamps (which are not covered by the OEO) were
expanded dramatically. Their limitations notwithstanding, those programs initiated by the War on Poverty went a long way toward alleviating the suffering of the least fortunate in the United States.
Despite these significant achievements,39 the War on Poverty ended
in conflict and disappointment. In a sense, the efforts of the Johnson
administration did not so much fail, as collapse under the weight of their
own rhetoric.40 Declaring "unconditional war" on poverty may have
been an effective public rallying cry at the program's outset by responding to the needs of a country still reeling from the assassination of President Kennedy. Nonetheless, it led to trumped-up expectations of a
program that never was intended to receive the large infusions of government
money necessary to accomplish the goals that had been set for
41
it.

One could argue that defeat was inevitable, due to the administra-

tion's embrace of internally contradictory rhetoric.42 On one level, the
38. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2701 (1964 & Supp. 11 1965-66).

39. For example, Chafe reports that the number of families living in poverty went from 40
million in 1959 to 25 million in 1968. WILLIAM H. CHAFE, THE UNFINISHED JOURNEY: AMERICA
SINCE WORLD WAR II 242 (1986).
40. Chafe observed that "[i]n the end, instead of being 'an unconditional war,' the antipoverty
effort was more like a sitzkrieg or 'phony' war." Id. at 243.
41. The Vietnam War may have been one major cause of the "failure" of the Great Society
programs by massively diverting funds away from the programs after the first several years. See,
e.g., MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE NEW AMERICAN POVERTY 21-22 (1984).
42. CHAFE, supra note 39, at 242.
[T]he conflicts that overtook the poverty program reflected the confusion and
contradictions inherent in the assumptions of those who initiated it. Failing to
address the problem of maldistribution of income, and emphasizing individual
opportunity instead of a massive program of employment, the Johnson
administration, almost by definition, eliminated the possibility of achieving the
goals it had announced.
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Johnson administration attributed the problems of America's poor to
large-scale "structural" matters such as income distribution and employment patterns, while at the same time, the Equal Opportunity Act spoke
in the language of individual opportunity and self-improvement, and
focused on programs in education and job training. 43 The "equal opportunity" focus folded nicely into the American liberalism of the time,
which rested on an image of the self-reliant individual, a tendency to
attribute poverty to individual laziness, and a faith in the skill of government experts as social engineers.44
Although the "equal opportunity" strand eventually dominated, the
War on Poverty also contained a more controversial component, in Title
II of the Act, which provided federal funds for community action programs (CAP) in local communities.4 5 The community action section
incorporated a requirement of "maximum feasible participation" from
the poor themselves in designing and administering the local programs. 4 6 The idea that the poor could be empowered by giving them a
central role in community-based programs intended to address their
problems was an important component of the initial years of the War on
Poverty, and had some adherents among legal activists at the time as
well.4 7 The community action programs did become the sites for much
effective organizing and much activist work in the turbulent years that
followed the passage of the Act. They made organizers, poverty workers, and even lawyers available as resources for the various social movements of the time, including the welfare rights movement, which is
48
discussed in more detail below.
Ultimately, the CAPs sparked conflicts that broke apart the political
Id.
43. Thomas Ross expands on the contradictory rhetoric of poverty, which deploys both the

notion that the poor are somehow responsible for their own situation (immorality), and that the
problems of the poor are "structural" and beyond the reach of legislators or judges (helplessness).
See generally Ross, supra note 25.
44. KATZ, supra note 24, at 92.
The CEA [Council of Economic Advisors] report revealed the hallmarks of

American liberalism in the early 1960s: an uneasy mix of environmental and
cultural explanations of poverty; a continuation of the historic American reliance on
education as a solution for social problems; trust in the capacity of government; and
faith in the power of experts to design effective public policies.
Id.
45. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452 § 202(a)(3), 78 Stat. 508 (1964).
46. Id.
47. The Calms were clearly advocates of a community-oriented approach. See Calm & Cal,
supra note 36.
48. At least some VISTA workers, who were affiliated with the community action offices,
were lawyers. Because they were not part of legal services, they had less restrictions on the kind
of work that they were able to do. Personal communication from John Sayer, former VISTA
lawyer.
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consensus that President Johnson had crafted in support of his anti-poverty efforts.4 9 In 1967, as a result of their direct and confrontational
actions on behalf of poor people against many branches and levels of
governmental authority, control of these organizations was given to
municipal and local authorities, and much of their political edge was
lost.5 0 When the two rhetorical strands of the War on Poverty, equal
opportunity and community action, collided with one another, rhetoric
had to give way to political expediency. The community action programs, despite their relatively brief success, have continued to provide
an important model for poverty advocates.
2.

THE BIRTH OF THE OEO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM

The incorporation of a legal services component into the Johnson
administration's attack on poverty came somewhat as an afterthought,
prodded by Edgar and Jean Cahn's 1964 article, The War on Poverty: A
5 1 The article proposed
Civilian Perspective.
a "university affiliated,
neighborhood law firm" which could "plac[e] at the disposal of a community the services of professional advocates and by providing the
opportunity, the orientation, and the training experience to stimulate
leadership amongst the community's present inhabitants."5 2 Calm and
Cahn's proposal was not without precedent. As Auerbach observed,
"suggestions for federally subsidized legal services and neighborhood
law offices were at least 25 years old; its novelty lay in their fusion at a
propitious moment.' '5 3 The moment was ripe to create a federally
funded legal services program. In May, 1964, Attorney General Robert
Kennedy gave a speech which acknowledged lawyer complicity in the
development of "two systems of law-one for the rich, one for the
poor" and called on the profession to address that problem:
In the final analysis, poverty is a condition of helplessness--of
inability to cope with the conditions of existence in our complex soci49.
Some deference to "citizen participation" has always been important in legitimizing
governmental action in America. But the Great Society programs went beyond
token representation. They gave money to ghetto organizations that then used the
money to harass city agencies. Community workers were hired to badger housing
inspectors and to pry loose federal welfare payments. Later the new community
agencies began to organize the poor to picket the welfare department or to boycott
the school system. Local officials were flabbergasted; one level of government and
party was financing the harassment of another level of government and party!
Francis F. Piven, quoted in KATZ, supra note 24, at 98.
50. Peter B. Edelman, Toward a Comprehensive Antipoverty Strategy: Getting Beyond the
Silver Bullet, 81 GEO. L.J. 1697, 1714 (1993).
51. Supra note 36.
52. Calm & Cahn, supra note 36, at 1334.
53. AUERBACH, supra note 37, at 270.

1994]

POVERTY LAW SCHOLARSHIP

1015

ety. . . . The inability of a poor and uneducated person to defend
himself unaided by counsel in a court of criminal justice is both symbolic and symptomatic of his larger helplessness.
But we, as a profession, have backed away from dealing with
that larger helplessness. We have secured the acquittal of an indigent
person-but only to abandon him to eviction notices, wage attachments, repossession of goods and termination of welfare benefits.
To the poor man, "legal" has become a synonym simply for
technicalities and obstruction, not for that which is to be respected.
The poor man looks on the law as an enemy, not as a friend. For
him the law is always taking something away.
It is time to recognize that lawyers have a very special role to
play in dealing with this helplessness. And it is time we filled it.54

Kennedy's account of the importance of providing access to legal
services fits in perfectly with the "equal opportunity" branch of the War

on Poverty rhetoric. Other poverty advocates, however, had not forgotten the lesson that law reform is useful as a mechanism for bringing

about wide scale social change, which had been demonstrated by the
great success of the NAACP's legal strategy culminating in the decision
of Brown v. Board of Education a decade before. The rhetoric of the
plan that that administration ultimately adopted incorporated both of
those influences.55
The Cahns' proposal, which influenced the formulation of the plan,
described the "civilian" perspective as one which would include oppor56
tunities for dissent and criticism from poor people and their allies.
According to the Calms, "[a] lawyer need not be apologetic for being
54. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Address at the University of Chicago Law School's
Law Day (May 1, 1964), quoted in Cahn & Calm, supra note 36, at 1336 n.27.
55. According to Harry Stumpf, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the
Department of Justice, and the Office of Economic Opportunity sponsored two three-day
conferences in 1964-65 on topics relevant to a federally funded legal aid program. By the fall of
1965, "the Legal Services Program had been formally established as a semiautonomous unit
within the Community Action Program." Stumpf, supra note 36, at 696. For a more extensive
history of the formation of the legal services program, see EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND
REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM (1974).
56.
The civilian perspective requires that the promotion of neighborhood dissent and
criticism be an avowed goal of the War on Poverty, that its organizational structure
make provision for the establishment of groups and institutions with the
independence, power, and express purpose of articulating grievances, that the
natural incentives to absorb, stifle or undermine dissenters be countered with the
creation of incentives to nurture, promote, and heed criticism, and that the
elimination of poverty be understood as comprehending spiritual values as well as
physical subsistence and as involving the assurance of civic as well as economic
self-sufficiency.
Calm & Calm, supra note 36, at 1331.
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partisan, for identifying. That is his function."57 Ed Sparer, another
influential individual during the formative period, also argued that welfare clients required not merely legal advice but militant advocacy.5 8
Some hoped that the use of the OEO legal services plan would extend to
the "use of legal means to reallocate political and economic power."5 9
Unfortunately, neither the Legal Service Program nor the Legal Services
Corporation achieved the radical aspirations of these early legal
activists.
Just as the community action programs eventually met with resistance from the bureaucratic structures that they were set up to challenge,
this reformist edge among those influential in the development of the
legal services program encountered resistance both from within the legal
profession and outside of it.60 Expanding access to legal services for the
disadvantaged was a much less controversial goal than broad-scale political and social transformation. Expanding services also fit more closely
into the dominant "opportunity" strand of the War on Poverty, as well as
the traditional conceptions of the lawyer's role as politically and morally
autonomous from their clients and narrowly confined to advising the
client on formal, "legal" issues. A narrower conception of the lawyer's
role may have proved attractive to overburdened legal services attorneys, who from the start were wrestling with the difficult issue of meeting a demand for legal service that greatly exceeded the supply.6 1 These
norms of autonomy and moral independence have only recently been
subjected to a sustained critique. 62 Legal services became an important
site for the struggle over the nature of the lawyer's role and the transformative potential of legal representation of the disadvantaged.
3.

THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT

The rise of a broad-based movement for the expansion and extension of welfare benefits in the mid-1960s is an important corollary to the
57. Id. at 1335.
58. Sparer, supra note 36.
59. AUERBACH, supra note 37, at 271.

60. The Legal Services Corporation, the successor to the OEO Legal Services Program,
encountered significant hostility and diminished levels of funding from the Nixon, Reagan, and
Bush administrations. Regarding the Nixon administration, see AUERBACH, supra note 37.
Regarding spending cuts under Reagan and Bush, see Rebecca Arbogast et al., Revitalizing Public
Interest Lawyering in the 1990's: The Story of One Effort to Address the Problem of
Homelessness, 34 How. L.J. 91, 93-94 (1991).
61. Carol R. Silver, The Imminent Failure of Legal Services for the Poor: Why and How to

Limit Caseload, 46 J. URB. L. 217 (1969).
62. Much recent scholarship has emerged that examines these assumptions. See DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS'

ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS (David Luban ed. 1983); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in
Lawyering, 101 HAav. L. REv. 1083 (1988).
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story of the early years of the OEO legal services program, in part
because many of the important victories of legal services in those years
related to welfare entitlements, culminating in the Supreme Court's 1970
decision of Goldberg v. Kelly.6 3 The legal assault on a host of widespread illegal welfare bureaucracy practices (including midnight raids,
unannounced terminations, and unexplained and improper denials of
benefits) and the growing movement of individuals who were asserting
their entitlement to public support, complimented and reinforced each
other. Even so, the welfare rights movement was relatively short-lived
as a national phenomenon, beginning in the second half of the 1960s and
ending in the early 1970s. The circumstances of its inception, its brief
flourishing, and its precipitous decline were necessarily closely bound to
the fate of poverty lawyers, both at that time and subsequently.64
Beginning in the first part of the decade, public attention began to
turn to the industrial cities of the North, where growing civil unrest and
riots announced the growing problems of poverty among African-Americans who had moved from the South but had been unable to find wellpaying jobs. The increased awareness of economic issues and the
increased programs offered through the OEO encouraged growing numbers of these impoverished families to apply for and receive some type
of governmental support. Organizers and activists turned their attention
from issues of racial equality to those of economic security, encouraging
greater and greater numbers of eligible families to apply for aid. The
community action programs facilitated this process by providing a large
supply of antipoverty workers, to educate and encourage people to
obtain assistance, and legal services attorneys to challenge adverse eligibility decisions and restrictive regulations in court.
The rapid expansion of the welfare rolls in the mid-1960s also has
been attributed to a significantly liberalized administration of the welfare programs themselves. Fewer families who applied were turned
away and fewer "audits" of recipients were done, resulting in very few
terminations or reductions of benefits. Part of this can be attributed to a
simple overtaxing of the system, and part to the atmosphere of civil
unrest that reigned at the time. Welfare officials were hesitant to institute policies that might aggravate the already tense situation in many
Northern cities.
63. 397 U.S. 234 (1970).
64. In outlining the history of the welfare rights movement itself, I have relied heavily on the
account provided by Piven & Cloward in POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS, supra note 36. Piven and
Cloward, however, make almost no references to the legal strategies and developments of the
time. Goldberg v. Kelly is not even mentioned in their index. A recent book that explores the
legal strategies of the welfare rights movement, is MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS
AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1993).
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In 1966, Frances Piven and Richard Cloward published an article
entitled A Strategy to End Poverty in The Nation, which provided data
supporting the assertion that for every family that was then receiving
welfare, another eligible family was not. Along with George Wiley,
who had formerly been the associate director of CORE (Congress of
Racial Equality), they were instrumental in forming the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), which officially began at a convention in August of 1967. From the outset, opinions differed regarding the
nature of and strategies which should be adopted by the organization.
While Piven and Cloward supported a "crisis strategy" designed to
mobilize as many poor people as possible to apply for welfare, Wiley
and others favored a membership-based approach which would link
membership in the organization to assistance with the resolution of welfare grievances. NWRO quickly became a national organization with a
great deal of visibility and perceived legitimacy. It was credited with
the massive expansion of people on welfare in the latter half of the
1960s, and the resulting crises in parts of the country, particularly New
York and California.
According to Charles Reich, author of The New Property,65 this
expansion of the numbers of people receiving welfare benefits was
accompanied by an increasing acknowledgement of the idea that people
might have a right to welfare. Reich argued for a new conception of
property rights that incorporated interests in such non-traditional "property" as government benefits.66
Reich's article laid the groundwork for a new way of thinking
about welfare, not as a privilege, but as an entitlement, which individuals could not be deprived of without procedural fairness. The Supreme
Court explicitly adopted this way of thinking six years later in the decision of Goldberg v. Kelly,67 which held that an AFDC recipient was
entitled to a fair hearing before benefits were terminated. Reich and
65. Charles A. Reich, Beyond the New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process, 56
BROOK. L. REv. 731, 735 (1990).
66. Id.
I argued that the function of property was to confer power on the individual-power
to control one's own life and to provide for one's own survival ....
But I also
pointed out that traditional property was no longer serving its function. It was being
replaced by non-traditional interests, such as government benefits, which represent
the individual's share in a society where value derives from relationships with
organizations more than it derives from separate ownership of land and other assets.
Accordingly, these non-traditional, relational interests should be treated as "new
property."
Id. Reich's original article, The New Property, supra note 36, was the most cited article ever
published in the Yale Law Journal. Fred Shapiro, The Most Cited Articles from the Yale Law
Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449, 1462 (1990-91).
67. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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other commentators at the time, however, had hoped that the Court
would establish a much more substantial right to welfare benefits than it
did in Goldberg v. Kelly. Reich argued that the poor ought to "own"
their entitlements to welfare. For him, the rights to life, liberty, and
property protection which are protected by the Due Process clause must
imply the right to personal survival.
Frank Michelman argued something quite similar with respect to
the Equal Protection clause; he suggested that the "judicial equality
explosion.., has largely been ignited by reawakened sensitivity, not to
equality, but to a quite different sort of value or claim which might better be called 'minimum welfare.' "68 Joel Handler observed that at that
time "[t]here was heady talk among the poverty law community of a
constitutional 'right to life' that would finally move America toward the
fulfillment of the social rights of citizenship. 69 Welfare rights became
a new idea in American social policy through the joint efforts of legal
philosophers, poverty lawyers, welfare rights activists, and hundreds of
thousands of poor people who had mobilized to demand their
entitlements. 7°
While the theoretical and grassroots aspects of the welfare rights
movement came together perfectly in the Goldberg v. Kelly decision, it
marked a climax from which there would be a relatively quick decline.
By the early 1970s, the movement's leaders seemed to have lost their
connection to the grassroots, as evidenced by the diminishing membership of their organization. Of course, the political climate was changing
and, as one commentator observed, by 1969, "[t]he American public was
sated beyond endurance with protest, no matter how legitimate the
grievances that inspired it, or how violent the resistance applied to
repress it."71 What had been an active and militant national organization
of and for welfare recipients turned into just another Washington lobby
group. A few years later, crippled by internal disagreements, the
national organization went bankrupt and the office was closed.72
68. Michelman, supra note 36, at 9.
69. Joel Handler, "Constructingthe PoliticalSpectacle ": The Interpretationof Entitlements,
Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 899, 900 (1990).
70. The idea of a property entitlement to welfare is controversial even among scholars on the
left. See William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE
L.J. 1198 (1983); William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L.
Rav. 1 (1985). This debate is taken up in some detail in Handler's Social Welfare History, supra
note 69.
71. AUERBACH, supra note 37, at 288.
72. Although the national organization went bankrupt in 1974, welfare activism at state and
local levels in other parts of the country survived. In Houston, for example, the welfare rights
movement did not start until around 1970, and was active until around 1977. Personal
communication with John Sayer, former VISTA and Legal Service lawyer, in Houston, Texas.
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By the early 1970s, a popular movement outside of the courtroom
no longer existed to lend legitimacy and a sense of social relevance and

urgency to the poverty lawyers' arguments inside the courtroom. This
was also a period of substantial retrenchment in the Supreme Court's
welfare rights decisions. 73 As Charles Reich observed, "the road opened

by Goldberg v. Kelly has not been taken. Instead there has been
retreat."'74 After a certain point in the 1970s, it no longer seemed possible to argue a right to welfare. As a result of this shift, which was itself

intertwined with the decline of the grassroots welfare rights movement,
the practice of lawyering for the poor was dramatically altered.75
B.

Theories of Lawyering Practice

The discussions of both the War on Poverty and the welfare rights
movement begin to reveal the extent to which the social and legal fields
have permeated the public discourse of poverty.7 6 This Section, expands
upon that argument by examining several ideologies underlying much of
the poverty lawyering practice of the period. To this end, I have identified three distinct lawyering approaches: liberal legalist, radical, and
critical. These categories are intended as ideal types, rather than depic-

tions of the actual practices of particular lawyers.
1.

LIBERAL LEGALISM

If one considers the law as a tool of social change, one could
73. The Supreme Court limited the principle enunciated in Goldberg v. Kelly to AFDC
recipients in the subsequent case of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), by holding that an
evidentiary hearing was not required prior to the termination of disability benefits. Other cases
that reflected a more general post-1970 welfare backlash are Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970) (refusing to force states to match grants to living needs); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309
(1971) (allowing states to require home visits by case workers as a condition of welfare); Jefferson
v. Hackney, 407 U.S. 535 (1972) (permitting states to reduce AFDC benefits more than assistance
programs despite disparate racial impact). For a full and careful discussion of the Court's postGoldberg v. Kelly retreat, see DAVIS, supra note 64, chs. 9-10.
74. Reich, supra note 65, at 731.
75. By the mid-1970s, according to Alan Houseman:
No longer could poverty law advocacy successfully create new rights or remedies or
rely primarily on federal courts. The work evolved into a much more complex
framework involving regulatory and legislative bodies and greater use of state
courts. Instead of creating new rights, Legal Services became the chief law enforcer
of existing rights of the poor.
Alan W. Houseman, The Vitality of Goldberg v. Kelly to Welfare Advocacy in the 1990s, 56
BROOK. L. REV.831, 837 (1990).

76. For a discussion of the concept of the "legal field," see Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of
Law: Toward a Sociology of the JuridicalField, 38 HASTrINOs L.J. 814 (1987). For a recent
development of Bourdieu's conception, see David Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the
Law: Studies of the Internationalizationof Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational
Arenas, 49 CASE W. Ras. L. REV. 407 (1994).
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describe liberal legalism as the default setting. Building upon a democratic, pluralist model of social organization, liberal legalists sought
incremental and procedural changes through the administrative system
and the courts.77 The liberal legalists believed that procedural changes
allowing underrepresented groups access to bureaucratic decision-making processes would result in substantive changes in the content of those
decisions.7" Ultimately, they thought that changes in representation and
substantive decisions would eventually redistribute power and create a
more just and democratic society.7 9
While liberal legalists recognized the existence of substantive inequities in society, they envisioned law reform as an incremental adjustment to an otherwise just system. As Justice Thurgood Marshall put it,
"public interest law seeks to fill some of the gaps in our legal system" by
"broadening the flow of information" to decisionmakers8 s In this way,
liberal legalism merged the ideal of "equal opportunity" with the notion
that law reformers could effectively "tinker with" the legal system to
more closely align it with the ideal of a just and democratic society.
It should be clear that liberal legalism envisions a social and legal
system that is coherent, identifiable, and predictable. The adjustments
that liberal legalists envisioned were large in scope yet procedural in
nature; substantive redistribution of social benefits would not be
required in a society with a properly functioning legal system. Liberal
legalists were also quite hopeful about their ability to change society
through law. For them, the law was a relatively precise and accurate
"tool" for the type of social engineering they considered possible.
Law reform eventually emerged as the predominant technique of
the liberal legalist model. Through "impact" or "test case" litigation,
law reformers sought changes to laws or policies that they saw as
adversely affecting the low income public. Law reform activity soon
gained greater prestige and legitimacy than it could through the "mere"
provision of legal services to the poor. Reformers received more funding, more attention, and greater status, and attracted the interest and
services of better educated lawyers.
When the War on Poverty's legal services program (the OEO) was
77. See generally JOEL HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY
OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978).
78. See Lois H. Johnson, The New Public Interest Law: From Old Theories to a New
Agenda, 1 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 169, 175 (1991); also Louise G. Trubek, Civic Justice Through
Civil Justice: A New Approach to Public Interest Advocacy in the United States, in ACCESS TO
JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE (M. Cappelleti ed. 1981).
79. HANDLER, supra note 77, at 222.
80. Ford Foundation and ABA Special Comm. on Public Interest Practice, Forwardto Public
Interest Law: Five Years Later (1976).
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started, its law reform aspects were modeled on the successful litigation
tactics of the LDF and the NAACP."1 Later, when numerous public
interest law firms emerged in the 1970s, many also assumed a law
reform focus. Impact litigation has become a widely understood
formula for accomplishing particular kinds of social changes. The typical strategy involves identifying a policy issue or government practice
that exhibits some degree of injustice, finding an individual or group of
individuals who had been harmed by the practice and who have a good
("winnable") case, devising a litigation strategy to target the practice in
question, and attempting to establish a broad legal precedent against that
practice's future use. This strategy, to be done well, requires the work
of theoreticians who could develop new constitutional arguments and
theories of interpretation, national coordination to select and manage
cases to bring before the right courts, and skillful advocates to successfully persuade courts to adopt those new and innovative arguments. 82
The extent to which a successful bid to extend new constitutional rights
might depend on the broader social and political context, and particularly the presence of an active and militant social movement, although
conceded to be relevant, is rarely considered as a central part of law
reform strategies, which tend to privilege the work of skilled advocates
and legal technicians.83

2.

RADICALISM

Radicalism is the second "ideal type" for conceptualizing poverty
lawyering approaches in the 1960s. Radical lawyers are best known for
challenging legal authority through high-profile political trials as a route
to social transformation.8 4 The political trials of the Chicago Seven, the
81. Institutionally, law reform activity was located in a number of regional "back-up centers"
while the local offices were primarily responsible for service work. This institutional split played
into the service/reform division that has been a key aspect of LSC work since its inception. See
William McCalpin, Individual Representation versus Law Reform: A False Dichotomy, in LEGAL
SERVICES FOR THE POOR 85-88 (Douglas Besharov ed. 1990).
82. For a call to a return to old-style impact litigation during a period of severe retrenchment
in legal services, see John Dooley & Alan Houseman, Legal Services in the 80's and Challenges
Facing the Poor, in CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Jan. 1982, at 704.
83. For two studies that contain critiques of liberal legalist approaches to reform, see
MICHAEL MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC INTEREST LIBERALISM

(1986) and SHERENE RAZAK, CANADIAN FEMINISM AND THE LAW: THE WOMEN'S LEGAL
EDUCATION AND ACTION FUND AND THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY (1991).
84. See, e.g., RADICAL LAWYERS (Jonathan Black ed. 1971). Important differences exist
among radical lawyers as to the appropriate role of the lawyer. Some "movement lawyers" who
also espouse critical Marxist perspectives explicitly downplay the lawyer's role. See, e.g., Steve

Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1984-85).
For another more recent example of radical lawyering scholarship, see Peter Gabel & Paul Harris,
Building Power andBreaking Images: CriticalLegal Theory and the Practiceof Law, 11 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1983).
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Black Panthers, and Wounded Knee are the most well-known examples
of an approach to lawyering that refused to comply with the hierarchies
of the court system, that explicitly politicized the legal process, and that
believed in the need for a fundamental overhaul of our liberal/capitalist
system of governance.
Unlike the liberal legalists, radical lawyers saw their legal work as
subordinate to the political work of "movement" activists in the streets
and communities. While radical lawyers sought dramatic social transformation, and argued that the existing capitalist order could be neither
legitimated nor sustained, few believed that those transformations would
occur primarily through legal means. Rather, radical lawyering was an
attempt to politicize the legal system. Radical lawyers endeavored to
reveal what they saw as the unjust and arbitrary exercise of power, both
inside the courtroom and throughout society as a whole. Some dismissed other types of public interest work, law reform and legal services, for having sold out to the existing power structures. Others were
more willing to strategically utilize whatever tactics seemed useful,
including legal work. Like the liberal legalists, radical lawyers emphasized large-scale structural change as a mechanism of social transformation, although the two groups differed on whether lawyers and legalism
were central to that process of change.
The prior Sections of this Article stressed the connections among
the theories of lawyering, the other discourses in circulation at the time,
and social events. It can be observed that the emphasis on large-scale
institutional change (scope), the instrumental approach to law and the
legal system (tools), and the optimism concerning the possibility for
change (hope) were all elements common to the radical and liberal legalist approaches of the 1960s and 1970s. This story, however, does not
yet describe all of the poverty lawyering scholarship at that time. Liberal legalist and radical approaches comprised the dominant discourse
about lawyering, but within both legal scholarship and poverty lawyering practices, "critical" perspectives also proliferated. By recovering
these subordinated discourses, one can discover the important links
between two generations of poverty law scholarship.

85. There were important differences among the approaches taken by these three. Criminal
defense lawyers in the Chicago Seven and Panther trials saw their primary task as securing the
defendants' liberty, then returning to their important movement work on the streets. The lawyers
in the Wounded Knee trials combined this type of criminal defense work with civil suits against
the government in a more broadly legalistic attempt to attain their clients' goals of securing rights
to their land. John Sayer, Social Movements in the Courtroom: The Wounded Knee Trials 197375 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota).
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CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES

Even during the heyday of the liberal legalist and radical
approaches poverty lawyers questioned both of those concepts. Their
critiques, questions, and concerns comprised a side of the old poverty
lawyering literature that is usually omitted from the "old" versus "new"
debate. Handler's nostalgia for the scope, instrumentality, and optimism
of the old approaches overlooks the critique that the submerged perspective provided. This "oversight" is really an exercise of power, which
erases critical perspectives existing at the margins of the dominant literature of the time.86
The interstitial critical literature from the 1960s and 1970s
prefigured the new approaches in a number of important respects. Both
emphasized the importance of community-organizing strategies and
warned against the dangers of restricting advocacy to test case litigation.
"A decision to go beyond test case litigation characterizes virtually all
the lawyers we interviewed," claimed the editors of a 1970 article The
New Public Interest Lawyers.8 7 One of the lawyers interviewed, Marian

Wright Edelman, reflected on her brief stint with the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund in Jackson, Mississippi: "The thing I understood after six
months there was that you could file all the suits you wanted to, but
unless you had a community base you weren't going to get anywhere."88
Like a number of the new scholar/advocates,89 these lawyers emphasized the importance of "working with organized groups of poor people,
working with organizers, and occasionally even organizing itself."9
Fundamental questions about the problematic nature of the poverty
lawyer's role and the power dynamics of lawyer/client relationships
were also raised:
There are, after all, significant dangers when middle class lawyers get
intimately involved in the task of organizing the poor. More articulate, better educated, aggressive by nature and training, some lawyers
tend to dominate newly formed groups, even when they try not to;
such dominance, even if the middle class lawyer has been able to
internalize the perspective of the poor, will generally result in the
same dependence on the lawyer which a strategy of test case litiga86. Examples of dissenting perspectives include:

Cahn & Cahn, supra note 36; Steven

Wexler, PracticingLaw for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970); Comment, The New Public
Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069 (1970).

87. Comment, supra note 86, at 1079.
88. Id. at 1081.
89. See, e.g., LOPEZ, supra note 3, at 331-79; Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of
the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535 (1987-

88).
90. JAMES, supra note 34, at 1078.
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tion inevitably means for the poor. 91
Many practitioners in the 1960s shared a focus on client empowerment, a critique of lawyer driven decision-making, and a concern for
integrating lawyering strategies with community organization and
mobilization. These were important aspects of the Calms' original
vision for legal services, but they soon took a back seat to the dominant
liberal legalist vision. 92 Indeed, the Cals' description of how the
"demands of war" function to suppress critique is a remarkably prescient
account of the marginalization of the critical lawyering approach.
According to the Cals, the perspective "of dissent, of critical scrutiny,
of advocacy and of impatience" is something which is customarily suppressed or disregarded in times of war, when the necessity for direction
and focus are allowed to prevail.93
While the Cal's observation was made in the context of President
Johnson's War on Poverty, it also seemed to ring true in the context of
poverty law's fight for survival in the hostile environment of the early
1980s, when critical perspectives were marginalized even further. The
retrieval and reexamination of older critical perspectives at this particular juncture may help to highlight the important points of continuity
among old and new poverty advocates, and to deepen the debate over
appropriate contemporary approaches to poverty lawyering.
IV.

REREADING THE NEW POVERTY LAW SCHOLARSHIP

The new poverty law scholarship is a literature that started to
emerge in the late 1980s and has gained momentum throughout the nineties. It is not a comprehensive or coherent literature, but is defined by a
loosely linked group of central concerns.94 Those concerns emerge from
91. Comment, supra note 86, at 1091 (footnotes omitted).
92. Consider, for example, John Flym. Id. at 1093.
93. Louise Trubek has suggested that another reason for the erasure of the older critical
perspectives was the bureaucratization and professionalization of the legal services corporation
which occurred in the mid-1970s. Interview with Louise Trubek, Clinic Director, University of
Wisconsin-Madison Law School (May 11, 1993).
94. Louise Trubek and I have identified those concerns in the following terms:
HUMANIZE: Resist reduction of client stories to legal categories; frame issues in
human terms. POLITICIZE: Use critical legal theory to provide insight into the

contingent nature of client disempowerment; apply feminist and anti-racist analysis
to help resist marginalization of clients' voices. COLLABORATE: Encourage
clients and client groups to participate in practice decisions; attempt to dismantle the
lawyer/client hierarchy. STRATEGIZE: Seek to access client experiences regarding
strategies for struggle and resistance; develop a healthy skepticism regarding
traditional advocacy arenas; continually re-evaluate advocacy effectiveness from a
client perspective. ORGANIZE: Encourage clients to organize and use collective
efforts; work with existing social movements and client groups.
See Buchanan & Trubek, supra note 8.

1026

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:999

a common critique of the professional hierarchy and the disinterestedness embedded in traditional lawyering approaches. Its methodological
and political starting point is the reinscription of clients as empowered
subjects into lawyering practices by unearthing suppressed client narratives. 95 The new scholars reject the search for overarching theories of
class struggle and oppression, and instead look to the everyday lives of
subordinated people for moments of dignity and resistance. 96 The stories embedded in this literature detail the ways in which poor people are
constantly enacting moments of resistance and devising strategies
of sur97
vival in their everyday negotiations with the legal system.
The new scholarship emerged from a critique of the old structural
approaches to embrace new post-structural notions of power, resistance,
and social change. The greater flexibility and fluidity of this poststructural approach allowed the poverty lawyers and scholars to rethink their
own advocacy efforts in nonhierarchical ways. Simple changes in the
way that lawyers greet their clients, set-up office waiting rooms, and
solicit client input were all suggested as ways in which lawyers could
transform their practices to create "nonhierarchical communities of
interest" with their clients. 98 The fundamental difference between "regnant" (traditional) lawyering practice and "rebellious" practice99 is situated in the myriad, daily, incremental effects which serve to produce and
reproduce social relations of power. Armed with these insights, the new
scholar/advocates were optimistic about the potential for future, selfreflective alliances between themselves as professionals and the
subordinated groups with which they worked. 1°°
Additionally, the new scholarship, in its effort to reinscribe the cli95. Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client
Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2120 (1991) ("Although divergent, the literature advances a
common project of constructing an alternative vision of the client as a self-empowering subject.").
See also Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participationand Subordinationof Poor Tenants'
Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 533 (1992) (exploring the experience of
Baltimore's housing court from the perspective of poor tenants).
96. See, e.g., White, supra note 19.
97. Among articles that attempt to reconstruct poor people's experiences of the legal process
are: Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769 (1992)
[hereinafter Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers]; Alfieri, supra note 20; Clark D.
Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of
Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992); Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law
Narratives: The CriticalPractice and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 861 (1992).
98. For a marvelously "thick" description of some of those alternatives, see LOPEZ, supra note
3.
99. See generally LOPEZ, supra note 3, ch. 1: "The Rebellious Idea of Lawyering Against
Subordination."
100. Stacy Brustin, Expanding Our Vision of Legal Services Representation-TheHermanas
Unidas Project, I AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 39 (1993); White, supra note 19, at 1504.
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ent as a subject, takes seriously the multiplicity and individuality of client identities. Different trajectories of marginalization and oppression
pose unique questions of advocacy and require particularized responses.
In the new poverty lawyering scholarship, multiple, partial, conflicting,
and shifting stories of oppression have replaced the old systemic notions
of the bureaucratic state as oppressor. The new advocates problematize
the older myths about collective struggle and the commonality of work
done by poverty lawyers in different regions and on behalf of different
groups.
Notwithstanding its postmodern emphasis on multiplicity, specificity, and difference, the new scholarship has also maintained a firm belief
in the efficacy of transformative legal work and the potential for positive
social transformation. The literature Seems to depend on an implicit
vision of social justice, transformation, and reconstruction. Although
the normative vision is the motivating force behind the literature, it is
usually absent in the text. The need for a normative vision of social
justice, and a degree of optimism regarding the possibility for transformative social action through law, are fundamental points of commonality
between the old and new approaches to poverty lawyering. In the new
approaches, however, the scope of the normative vision is tempered by
an acknowledgement of the differences among specific trajectories of
disempowerment, and its optimism is accompanied by a greater appreciation of the limits of purely legal strategies.
A.

Social Context

At first blush, some startling similarities exist between aspects of
the new poverty scholarship and the submerged critical discourse of the
early 1960s. There are also many important differences. As I observed
with respect to the Handler debate, it can be misleading to compare theories of social change lawyering which have been abstracted from their
historical and social contexts. In this Section, I examine the "mode of
production" of the new scholarship in order to evaluate both its critique
of traditional social change lawyering and its debt to that tradition. 10
Thus, the next Section explores the social and intellectual struggles in
three arenas important to the emerging new scholarship: public policy
discourse, the legal profession, and legal education.
101. "Mode of production" refers to the material and discursive conditions in which this
scholarship was written, which includes the current political and intellectual debates, their likely
influence on the authors, and their institutional position. I have adapted this approach from sociolegal examinations of the modes of production of law. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, On
Modes of Production of Law and Social Power, INT'L J. Soc. L. 299 (1985); see also David
Trubek et al., supra note 76.
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THE CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL AND THE REAGAN YEARS

The decade of the 1980s presented a very different set of challenges
for poverty advocates than did the 1960s. Yet, theoretical approaches to
poverty lawyering practice often fail to account for its interpenetration
with current public discourse about the poor or, more broadly, with the
changing social, political, and economic contexts in which poverty
advocacy takes place. A powerful discourse of "entitlement" surrounded discussions of welfare recipients in the 1960s. By the mid1970s, however, it was no longer possible to argue for policy innovations like a guaranteed minimum income, which had been discussed
widely and favorably only a few years before. By the early 1980s, as
people realized that America's long era of increasing prosperity had
come to an end, things were looking bad for society's neediest segments. 10 2 Reagan's election as President in 1980 inaugurated the conservative restoration which had been spawned in part by America's
growing economic insecurity in an increasingly international marketplace. The Reagan Administration's neoconservative domestic agenda
drastically cut programs for disadvantaged groups, severely constrained
the federal government's regulatory scope, and pursued a right wing
"social values" agenda that sought to roll back many of the preceding
decades' gains in civil, women's, environmental, and consumer
03
rights.1
Welfare recipients became a major target of the new conservatism,
held up as symbols of the "fat" that had led to the American economy's
"stagflation" in the late 1970s." ° The conservative attack on the poor
consisted roughly of three stages, although the public rhetoric of the era
often mixed and matched them rather indiscriminately. First, there were
attempts to redefine the poor out of existence.10 5 Second, conservatives
attacked welfare benefits for "causing" poor people's problems. Finally,
they moralistically called for the attachment of "workfare" obligations to
social programs. The 1970s and 1980s saw a proliferation of books and
articles focusing on the negative effect of increased levels of public
expenditures for increasingly unpopular social programs. 10 6 The con102. See generally HARRINGTON, supra note 41; KATZ, supra note 24.
103. NAN ARON, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL 14-21 (1989).
104. For a discussion of the attack on welfare, see Barbara Ehrenreich, The New Right Attack
on Social Welfare, in THE MEAN SEASON: THE ATTACK ON THE WELFARE STATE (Fred Block et
al. ed. 1987).
105. E.g., MARTIN ANDERSON, WELFARE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WELFARE REFORM IN
THE UNITED STATES 15 (1978) ("The 'war on poverty' that began in 1964 has been won. The
growth of jobs and income in the private economy, combined with an explosive increase in
government spending for welfare and income transfer programs, has virtually eliminated poverty
in the United States.").
106. Two of the most well-known and influential books of this genre were GEORGE GILDER,
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servative argument was simple: poor people, especially African-Americans, were voluntarily withdrawing from the labor market in increasing
numbers to live on the generous welfare benefits that had been made
available to them since 1965. Black unemployment, increasing numbers
of single female head-of-households, and increasing crime were all
attributed to the perverse effect of increased societal generosity. The
argument that increased welfare benefits actually caused millions of
workers to exit the job market in the 1980s overlooked longer term
trends that have become increasingly obvious in the American labor
market. For example, more low wage and part-time jobs accompany
inexorable reductions in unionized and skilled positions in the "rustbelt"
industries.107
The new rhetoric of welfare was accompanied by a drastic decrease
in most types of benefits by 1982, just when a serious recession was
driving more people out of jobs and into unemployment lines. Virtually
all federal programs providing benefits for the poor were modified significantly or reduced by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981.108 Notwithstanding the rhetorical and real attack on allegedly
bloated benefit levels, the real value of benefits such as AFDC, not
indexed for inflation, had been decreasing for some time.10 9 Income
disparity increased during the 1980s, not only because of the drastic
reduction in benefits for the poor, but also because the tax burden of the
very rich was reduced.' 10 The middle class also experienced a serious
decline in what has been called the "decade of greed." Despite the
increasingly obvious signs of economic distress-resulting in the emergence of two new categories of extreme poverty, the homeless and the
"underclass"-few liberal responses were able to marshall the public
imagination as effectively as the conservative antipoverty discourse had.
In addition to its assault on redistributive social programs, the Reagan Administration took aggressive steps within government bureaucracies and the judiciary to reverse liberal gains made in the 1960s and
WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981), which has been described as the "Bible of the Reagan
Administration," and CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1984). Michael Harrington described
Murray as "a latter day Malthusian who holds that helping the poor often promotes poverty."
HARRINOTON, supra note 41, at 144.
107. See generally BENNETr HARRISON & BARY BLUESTONE, THE GREAT U-TuRN:
CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND THE POLARIZING OF AMERICA

(1988).

108. For an overview of these changes and how they were perceived to effect the task of legal
advocates for the poor, see Dooley & Houseman, supra note 82, at 101.
109. Welfare benefits have been falling steeply since 1972. The real dollar value of the
average AFDC grant for a family of three fell by 41% between 1972 and 1991. If food stamps,
which are indexed, are considered, the drop is 27%. Edelman, supra note 50, at 1722.
110. Id. at 1721 ("[O]nly the top twenty percent of American earners had an increased share in
the pie by the end of the decade.").
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1970s. Reagan committed himself not simply to cutting-back, but to
eliminating entirely the Legal Services Corporation. Every year during
his administration, President Reagan submitted budget proposals which
contained zero level funding for the Legal Services Corporation in an
ongoing battle with Congress, which continued to appropriate money for
the Corporation, albeit at reduced levels.I1 ' Reagan appointed new leaders to the Legal Services Corporation, the Civil Rights Commission and
the Environmental Protection Agency, all of whom were essentially hostile to the organizations' missions. Additionally, Reagan undertook an
ambitious attempt to entirely reshape the federal judiciary, appointing
over half of the federal judges during his two terms in office. His goals
were relatively transparent: to encourage a retreat from the judicial
activism of the 1960s and 1970s, and to find judges who would support
his social agenda, which included as its key issues school prayer, the
death penalty, and the elimination of abortion and affirmative action.'I 2
By the end of Reagan's second term, the terrain in which poverty lawyers found themselves operating had been dramatically and uncomfortably transformed.' II
Indeed, by the late 1980s, prospects seemed worse for poverty lawyers than ever before. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
bolstered the neo-liberal economic consensus of the Reagan/Bush era to
near political unassailability. 14 At home, conservative appointees who
were unsympathetic to poverty lawyers' creative arguments gradually
filled the bench and fewer law school graduates were attracted to the
diminishing number of public interest positions."I 5 Homeless people filled the streets and subways of not just Los Angeles, Washington, and
New York, but of smaller cities as well. Increasing numbers of previously employed people found themselves relying on dwindling and
overtaxed social programs. Racial problems in urban centers increased
rather than diminished. Growing problems coupled with diminishing
11. One former Senator described Reagan's attack on the Legal Services Corporation as
follows:
There are three ways to kill a program, and the President with respect to Legal
Services has tried all three. One way is to kill it outright. That didn't succeed.
Another is to fund it at such a low level as to make it inoperative. From Reagan's
point of view he made a little progress on that, he got the budget cut. And the third
way is to put the management and the oversight of the program in unfriendly hands.
ARON, supra note 103, at 14.
112. Id.at 18.
113. Id. at 18-19; see also Arbogast et al., supra note 60, at 94; Gabel, supra note 30.
114. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKAYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
115. On the diminishing numbers of law school graduates entering public interest jobs, see
ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS:

VISIONS OF LAW AT HARvARD AND BEYOND

5

(1992) ("[tjhe last decade and a half has seen a steady decline of student willingness to enter
public interest law") (footnote omitted).
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resources undermined poverty lawyers' efforts to work effectively
within their old lawyering strategies. Frustrated with their inability to
bring about enduring social change, and facing the apparent bankruptcy
of the conventional understandings that had emerged from the activism
of the 1960s and 1970s, some poverty lawyers looked for opportunities
to rethink their advocacy efforts.
2.

COUNTERVAILING FORCES WITHIN LEGAL EDUCATION AND
THE PROFESSION

The hostile climate in which poverty lawyers operated in the 1980s
was counterbalanced by several important struggles within legal education and the legal profession over the nature and legitimacy of the lawyer's professional project. The professionalization of public interest
law, the continuing growth of law school clinics, and the development of
powerful leftist critiques within the law schools (particularly those being
made by women and people of color) created new spaces within the
debate about law and social change. They provided an ongoing commitment, an institutional location and an emerging and vigorous intellectual
framework for the development of new approaches to poverty lawyering
and scholarship.
Public interest law, by the 1980s, had become a permanent part of
the American social and political landscape. Notwithstanding difficulties in obtaining government funding and in declining foundation support, public interest law firms representing consumer, environmental,
women's, civil liberties, and poverty concerns continued to be a visible
and active force in their respective policy and advocacy arenas.'1 6 A
number of conservative "public interest" organizations also sprang up,
which demonstrates the extent to which legal advocacy had become an
established mode for the pursuit of social change. In the 1980s, the
debate within the profession's governing body over the extent of its public service obligation reemerged and new calls were made for commitment to public service from leaders of the profession."I 7 The belief that
the law can and ought to be deployed to benefit disadvantaged groups in
society continued to persist in the hostile 1980s, despite criticisms
mounted from both the left and the right. It was also an important precondition for the emergence of the new poverty law scholarship.
Clinical legal education, which had its origins in the early 1960s,
116. See ARON, supra note 103, at 63-74.

In the Spirit of Public
117. Commission on Professionalism, American Bar Ass'n, .
Service": A Blueprintfor the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism (1986); see also articles
discussing the report collected in Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crisesor One, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/
LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (Robert L.
Nelson et al. eds. 1992).
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now has been included in over half of the 174 law schools in the United
States, employing over 400 clinicians.' 1 8 The debates within clinical
education in the 1980s have in one sense paralleled the broader debates
within the profession and within legal education over the obligation to
provide public service.) 19 While the primary motivations for the creation of the early clinics were service and pro bono representation, many
clinics in the 1980s focused on skills training for future lawyers. Simulations and role-playing replaced live clients in many clinics, reflecting
both the changing political and financial realities within law schools. 20
At the same time, clinics have served as petri dishes in which nascent
critiques of traditional lawyering and early experiments with alternative
approaches have been encouraged to grow. 12 As increasing numbers of
formerly marginalized clinical professors have gained legitimacy and
status for their specialty, 122 they have reached beyond traditional doctrinal approaches to poverty law scholarship and drawn on insights from
critical scholars both inside and outside of the legal academy to produce
an increasingly complex body of scholarship.
Many of the insights that have made their way into the new scholarship, mostly produced by scholar/advocates affiliated with clinics, have
come from Critical Legal Studies (CLS), Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Race Scholarship, and the sources on which these legal academic
traditions draw. 123 The critique of liberal legalism contained within that
118. Louise G. Trubek, U.S. Legal Education and Legal Services for the Indigent: A
Historicaland Personal Perspective,5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES (1994).
119. One contribution to this debate, in the context of Canadian legal education, argued
persuasively that law schools are structured to preserve and reproduce status quo hierarchies.
Jarnie Cassels & Maureen Maloney, CriticalLegal Education: Paralysiswith a Purpose,4 CAN.
J. L. Soc'Y 99 (1989); see also DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION
oF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983).

120. See Steven F. Befort, Musings on a Clinic Report: A Selective Agenda for Clinical Legal
Education in the 1990s, 75 MINN. L. REv. 619, 621 (1991); Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the
Practicein ClinicalEducation and Scholarship,43 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1189 (1992); Association
of American Law Schools Committee Report, The Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 508 (1992).

121. The Ford Foundation-funded Intenmiversity Consortium on Poverty Law has brought
together a number of these types of clinics (although the Consortium is not limited to clinical
projects). For reports on a number of these efforts, see Howard Erlanger & Gabrielle Lessard,
Mobilizing Law Schools in Response to Poverty: A Report on Experiments in Progress, 43 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 199 (1993). See also the articles collected in the Interuniversity Poverty Law
Consortium Symposium, 42 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 57 (1992).
122. On the marginality of clinical legal education, see Mark V. Tushnet, Scenes from the
Metropolitan Underground: A CriticalPerspective on the Status of Clinical Education, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 272 (1984).
123. These literatures are too vast and diverse to cite here. On CLS, however, see generally
THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed. 1991); Boyle, supra note 13;
Peller, supra note 13; CriticalLegal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984). For critiques
from a feminist and minority perspective, see generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM

1994]

POVERTY LAW SCHOLARSHIP

1033

scholarship has important implications for public interest practitioners,
because it assails the foundations of the paradigm that had provided
them with an important source of legitimacy. Critical scholars assaulted
the primary distinction between law and politics, revealing the extent to
which legal rhetoric and legal institutions maintain and reproduce
existing class, race, and gender hierarchies. Clinical scholars
then
124
turned this critique onto the lawyer/client relationship itself.
Both critical and clinical scholars saw themselves as creating an
intellectual and social environment more favorable to progressive social
change. Yet by the late 1980s, the CLS movement (as distinct from
minority and feminist scholarship) had exhausted much of its energy as
a political and intellectual force in law schools. 25 One explanation for
the declining political influence of CLS has been its focus on mandarin
legal materials and its analysis of doctrine, at the expense of a broader
1 26
engagement with the interpenetration of legal and social phenomenon.
One way to describe the project of some of the new poverty law scholars
is as applied critical scholarship. Whether this is an accurate description
of the new scholarship, and, if so, the extent to which its goals have been
accomplished, can only be determined through a detailed examination of
the models of lawyering embedded in the new scholarship.
B.

Theories of Lawyering Practice

Throughout this section, I have spoken about the new poverty
lawyering scholarship as if it were a coherent and unified body of writing. Although a number of important resemblances exist among the various scholars who are affiliated with this group, there are many points of
difference and divergence as well. This Section attempts to explore the
range and particularity of this literature. For this purpose, I have organized my reading of the new scholarship into four categories: assumptions about the relationship between theory and practice, the nature of
legal representation, the lawyer/client relationship, and the question of
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS (1992); Mar Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and

Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R./C.L. L. Rav. 323 (1987).
124. Discussions of the usefulness of critical scholarship for new poverty scholars are
contained in Erlanger & Lessard, supra note 121; Johnson, supra note 5; Trubek, supra note 2; see
also Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a ClinicalPerspective on CriticalLegal
Theory, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992).
125. The ten-year anniversary of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, held in 1987, might
be considered the end of its formal existence as a political and intellectual movement, although
numerous CLS-style scholars have continued to produce valuable legal scholarship since that
time.
126. See David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: CriticalLegal Studies and Empiricism, 36
STAN. L. REV. 575 (1984).
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client empowerment.1 27 Not surprisingly, in each of these areas I have
found substantial ambiguity and dissimilarity among the views
expressed in the literature. For each category, I have identified a pair of

related but distinct models of the lawyer's role. As in the preceding
Section, the models represent ideal types rather than the practice of any

particular lawyer. While I intend the models to illustrate the points of
difference among the theorists that I have identified with the new poverty law scholarship, they also represent the paradoxical nature of the
project of lawyering on behalf of the poor. 128 An acute appreciation of
the ambiguities at the core of this scholarship is integral to the task that
these scholar/practitioners have undertaken, and to which I hope to contribute in this Article.
1.

THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER AND THE PRACTICING THEORIST

As I have already observed, one major point of convergence within
the new literature on poverty law is the intersection of theory and practice. 129 Reflections on theory and practice, however, can take many
forms.13 0 While some have argued that practitioners of poverty law
ought to be informed by the insights of recent developments in legal
theory, particularly its critical, race, and feminist strands,13 1 others suggest that theories used by, and useful, to poverty lawyers arise out of and
are informed by the ongoing process of lawyering itself.132 Both perspectives are well represented in the new literature on poverty law, but
127. Although I am aware of the hierarchical assumptions embedded in the use of the terms
"lawyer" and "client," I have found myself unable to come up with an alternative to concisely
express the same thing without such "baggage."
128. See Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56
BROOK. L. Rav. 861 (1990).

129. See generally Symposium, Theoretics of Practice,supra note 4.
130. See Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice,43 HASTINGS L.J.
971, 981-88 (1992) (describing several aspects of theory and practice).
131. Alfieri, supra note 95, at 2120.
Theoretical analysis of practice is commanded by the historical failure of poverty
law traditions to countenance the values and to design effective methods of client
and community empowerment, and moreover, by the import of critical theory in the
domains of power, gender, and race. Distilled here by the writings of continental,
feminist, and critical race scholars, critical theory assails the interpretive paradigm
central to the practice of poverty law, a paradigm that conjures the image of the
client as a dependent and inferior object.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Margaret M. Russell, Entering Great America: Reflections on
Race and the Convergence ofProgressiveLegal Theory and Practice,43 HASTINGS L.J. 749, 751
(1992) (exploring "the relevance of insights from the emerging field of race theory to an analysis
of problems experienced ... by members of racially subordinated groups").
132. See L6PEz, supra note 3, at 66 ("Theoretical work fluidly interacts with practical thought:
Careful observation, generalization across situations, and the invention and deployment of
strategies lead to continued observation, reassessment and perhaps revision of generalizations, and
a newly informed strategic ensemble.").
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their paradoxical relationship is rarely remarked upon. 3 3 In distinguishing between applying theory to the practice of poverty law, and deriving

theory from practice, through the use of ideal types of the "practicing
theorist" and the "reflective practitioner," I reveal the significance of
each of these strands to the new poverty lawyering project.
The Reflective Practitioner 34 engages in what Lucie White has

called "situated theoretical practice.' 35 In this view theorizing is a necessarily partial, provisional, and perspectival activity.' 36 It is an
approach that acknowledges the manner in which subjects are socially
constructed, 13 and acknowledges particularly how the differing social
and cultural understandings of lawyers and clients complicate their interactions.'

38

Reflective practice is a bottom-up, rather than a top-down,

approach to knowledge. 39 In contrast to older, more static and more
authoritative approaches to theory-building, the Reflective Practitioner
133. The Editors' Forward to the Hastings Symposium, supra note 4, provides an example.
The Forward specifies as its primary goal "the reciprocal integration of insights between
progressive legal theories and the teaching and practice of law" but goes on to claim that "only
through critical self-reflection situated in active practice contexts can lawyers, who must be both
thinkers and actors, sensitize themselves to the differences of experience and viewpoint between
themselves and their clients, and among their clients." Symposium, supra note 4, at xix. The
Editors appear to assume, rather unproblematically, that these projects are complementary.
134. While I have borrowed the term from Donald Sch6n, and owe much to his analysis, I
make no attempt to conform my use to his. See generally DONALD A. SCHON, TE REFLCrIVE
PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION (1983).
135. Lucie White's definition of "situated theoretical practice" can hardly be improved upon
and, therefore, is worth restating in full:
[S]ituation theoretical practice (is] the slow learning that comes from multiple,
partial perspectives, from uncertain readings by advocates of their own day to day
work. In this view, the project of doing theory is itself "reconstructed" into a
collective practice. Rather than a task reserved to scholars, theory becomes a habit
of ongoing conversational reflection about how to describe the problems, make
alliances, devise strategies, and thus move together toward a better world. Theory is
the ongoing practice of reflection among the communities of poor people and their
allies that are constituted by the work they come together to do.
White, supra note 21, at 855 (footnotes omitted).
136. L6PEZ, supra note 3, at 65-66 ("Unlike many theoreticians, though, rebellious lawyers...
aren't out to find some 'truth' that makes sense of everything in this world. Nor do they pretend
to settle things once and for all. Instead, they try to develop stock ways of seeing and talking
about situations useful for specific purposes.").
137. "[R]ealities experienced by the subject are not in any way transcendent or
representational, but rather particular and fluctuating, constituted within a complex set of social
contexts." Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv.L. REv.829, 877-78 (1990).
138. Anthony Alfieri describes this interaction as a "violent" interpretive struggle. Alfieri,
supra note 95, at 2118.
139. See LPEZ, supra note 3.
What may distinguish these lawyers from many other theoreticians is that they build
their theories from the ground up. They pay close attention to what people do and
say, to the commingling of ideas and actions in daily life; they then try to capture in
thought the order of these observed patterns.
Id. at 65.
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continually engages in the humble process of revising and reinterpreting
her understandings and strategies in accordance with1 4the new situations
and experiences that she encounters in her practice. 1
Donald Sch6n likens this project to that of "a researcher in the practice context.' 14 I Although that analogy is instructive, the Reflective
Practitioner in poverty law is both more and less than a researcher. She
engages in the collaborative construction of understandings, goals and
strategies with clients. The Reflective Practitioner's process of constructing knowledge, therefore, really cannot be explained independently
of a particular set of understandings about the nature of lawyer/client
discourse, legal representation, and the politics of a poverty law practice.
The notion of reflective practice, in itself, is normatively empty. It does
not show us what a "good" poverty lawyering practice would look like
because it is independent of content derived from particular lawyering
experiences. Nor does it show us how to link those experiences together
into a broader understanding of social mechanisms of marginalization
and disempowerment.
In contrast, the Practicing Theorist looks to broader normative
insights to inform and make sense of her practical experiences.
Most frequently, contributors to the new literature on poverty lawyer-

140. Striking similarities exist between this model and the feminist methodology of
consciousness-raising. For example:
Consciousness-raising as feminist method is a form of praxis because it transcends
the theory and practice dichotomy. Consciousness-raising groups start with
personal and concrete experience, integrate this experience into theory, and then, in
effect, reshape theory based upon experience and experience based upon theory.
Theory expresses and grows out of experience but it also relates back to that
experience for further refinement, validation, or modification.
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectivesfrom the Women's
Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 602 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
141. SCHON, supra note 134, at 68.
When someone reflects-in-action, he becomes a researcher in a practice context. He
is not dependent on the categories of established theory and technique, but
constructs a new theory of the unique case. His inquiry is not limited to a
deliberation about means which depends on a prior agreement about ends. He does
not keep means and ends separate, but defines them interactively as he frames a
problematic situation. He does not separate thinking from doing, ratiocinating his
way to a decision which he must later convert to action. Because his experimenting
is a kind of action, implementation is built into his inquiry.
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ing have turned to continental philosophy, 142 critical legal studies, 143
feminism, 1" and critical race scholarship 45 in their search for insights
into the complexities and dilemmas that are inherent in working to
improve the situation of disadvantaged groups. Lucie White has criticized this approach as "impatient" or "imperative" theorizing, because it
seems to claim for itself "a perspective that is curiously freed from the
concrete engagement, the partiality, and hence the ambiguity of its own
vantage-point."1 46 While White's critique is compelling, the possession
of a vantage point brings a baggage of theories and ideas that do not all
emerge from the practitioner's specific experience.' 47 These broader
social discourses and understandings necessarily inform our lawyering
practices, as they are part of the terrain in which poverty lawyers operate. Because we are all historically and discursively situated, we must
work with the tools at our disposal. We must take the discourses as we
find them and accommodate them to suit our own local situations and
problems.
The model of the Reflective Practitioner does not supply any content for our musings. Some of that content must come, at least in part,
from the theories that this literature draws upon, particularly those theories that are concerned with oppositional narratives and counter-hegemonic struggles. In short, one must also become a Practicing Theorist,
strategically deploying theories about how those who have been traditionally excluded and marginalized can work toward reinscribing themselves as subjects of social institutions and discourses. Nevertheless, the
Reflective Practitioner warns us against becoming overly invested in the
correctness of any particular theory, and encourages us to continuously
scrutinize our working presumptions. The tension between these two
models-between the imperative of theory and the improvisation of
142. The most frequently cited is Foucault, although references to the work of Antonio

Gramsci, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Friederich Nietzsche, Jurgen Habermas, and Paul Ricoeur are not
uncommon. See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 95, at 2120 n.46; see also Marie Ashe, The "Bad
Mother" in Law and Literature: A Problem of Representation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1017 passim

(1992) (discussing contributions of French theorists Foucault, Derrida, and Kristeva to the
"narrative" turn of scholarship in the United States).
143. E.g., Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, supra note 97 (relying on Roberto

Unger's "critical framework"); see also Gilkerson, supra note 97, at 870 (encapsulating the CLS
critique of "liberal legalism").

144. See generally White, supra note 19. See also Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-PracticeSpiral:
The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MiNN. L. REv. 1599 (1991).

145. See Russell, supra note 131.
146. White, supra note 21, at 855.
147. Nor does White avoid it herself. See, e.g., Lucie E. White, To Learn and to Teach:
Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wisc. L. REV. 699, 747 (1988) (using
Steven Luke's tripartite analysis of power).
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practice-is one of the constitutive struggles of poverty lawyering
scholarship.
2.

THE TRANSLATOR AND THE SHADOW

The nature of representation is another important subject of reexamination and critique in the new poverty law scholarship. The act of
representing the views of others is a deeply contradictory aspect of the
lawyer's role. By taking on the obligation and the power to speak on
their clients' behalf, lawyers necessarily reenact the subordination that
48
their clients experience in the world, for the purpose of overcoming it.1
A major goal of the new scholarship is to innovate new lawyering
approaches that clients will experience as "empowering."
Two distinct models of empowerment through representation are
embedded in the new scholarship. One model holds that, although perfect understanding is never possible, the lawyer's role is to act as a
mediator between the client's world and the legal world. Through
empathy, ethnography, and experience, the poverty lawyer-as-translator
is able to act as a reasonably effective go-between on behalf of his clients. The second model focuses on the inevitable transformation of
meaning which attends all acts of translation.14 9 It describes the lawyer
as engaged in an interpretive struggle with the client over the meaning of
his or her experience.' 50 In this second model, client empowerment can
only mean the literal coming to voice of the client by allowing her to
retain the power to name her own experience. It frames the lawyer's
role as a shadow figure, ensuring from the sidelines that the client's
voice is heard.
Both the Translator and the Shadow start from similar assumptions
about the relation between experience, language, and knowledge.
"Knowledge is neither independent of nor simply dependent on experience; rather, the conceptual world is constituted out of the elements of
experience. In this model, language plays a central role in the constitution of knowledge as experience."' 51 Because the life experiences of
lawyers and their clients are different, so too are the conceptual catego148. White, supra note 128, at 861.
149. See generally JAMES B. WHITE,
LEGAL CRITICISM (1990).

JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION:

AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND

150. Alfieri, supra note 95, at 2112.
151. Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2459, 2474 (1989); see also Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 639 (1990); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon
Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2225 (1989); Steven L. Winter,
TranscendentalNonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning and the Cognitive Stakesfor Law, 137 U. PENN.
L. REv. 1105 (1989).
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ries by which they name those experiences. The communication gap 1 52
between lawyers and clients is a starting point for analyzing the repre153
sentation by both models.
Professor Clark Cunningham described the metaphor of lawyering
as translation as both an acknowledgement of the inescapable limits on
the lawyer's ability to accurately represent what his client is saying to
him and as "a model for recognizing and managing the inevitable
changes in meaning in a way that may empower rather than subjugate
the client."15 4 Yet, Cunningham gave no clear prescription for accomplishing this second goal of managing the inevitable changes in an
empowering way. He acknowledged the problem of silencing, but
155
attributed it mostly to the personal failings of the lawyers involved.
Professor Gerald L6pez has contributed to the lawyering as translation view by expanding upon the mechanisms, the everyday processes of
persuasion, and the problem-solving by which this translation takes
place. L6pez emphasizes the continuity between professional and lay
lawyering not only to de-mystify professional lawyering, but also to
alert us to the complexities of our everyday practices.
The nature of practice is even more enigmatic than the nature of law.
In large part, this is true because the practice of law, like the practice
of living, evolves without an adequate language to describe it, at least
without a way of talking specifically about the remarkably subtle and
complex thinking expressed in practical action. Legal and lay practice both bore and astound
us; they strike us as at once too little and
56
too much for words.'
By acknowledging the interpenetration of lay and legal culture, and
152. See Cunningham, supra note 151, at 2483.

If language is intimately bound up with the way we think about experience, then
talking about experience in a different language entails knowing that experience in a
somewhat different way. Thus the translator must give new meaning in the process
of translation, yet at the same time the translator strives to speak not as herself, but
as another. The translator is faced by the same kind of gap as the lawyer, a gap
marked by language.
Id.
153. It is easy, however, to mistake this common starting point for a method of doing poverty
law. Gilkerson provides one example. "Drawing strength from the disempowered client's own
previously silenced voice, translated client narratives hold possibilities for empathic understanding
not normally available in authoritative legal discourse." Gilkerson, supra note 97, at 926. While
it is possible for some aspects of the client's story to survive its translation by the lawyer, it can
only be either the client's voice that is speaking or the lawyer/translator's.
154. Cunningham, supra note 151, at 1300 (footnote omitted).
155. "[O]ne can understand much of the silencing of the client's voice as the lawyer's failure
to recognize and implement the art and ethic of the good translator-a translator who shows
conscious awareness of shifts in meaning and who collaborates with the speaker in managing
these shifts." Id.
156. LOPEZ, supra note 3, at 44.
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the continuities between lay and legal problem-solving strategies, one
may de-mystify the lawyer's translation role, but not eliminate it.
According to L6pez, lawyers must still be bicultural (capable of translating in two directions), "creating both a meaning for the legal culture out
of the situations that people are living, and a meaning for people's practices out of the legal culture."' 7 L6pez provides an important corollary
to the lawyer-as-translator metaphor without changing the basic argument that a poverty lawyer's effectiveness depends upon acquiring some
set of skills or qualities that will improve her ability to translate for
clients.
The narratives that Professor Cunningham and other new poverty
law scholars have carefully assembled from their own advocacy experiences often seem to cut against the implied optimism of the translation
metaphor.'15 The point of stories like Professor Cunningham's Dujon
Johnson (or White's Mrs. G) is that even the most empathetic and subtle
advocate cannot avoid misunderstanding her client during the process of
representation, because lawyers and clients have widely divergent conceptual schema. The lawyer-as-translator metaphor breaks down in the
experiential gulf between most lawyers and clients.
The lawyer-as-shadow emerges at this point to radically critique the
nature of legal representation. This model deploys a Foucaultian appreciation of the myriad ways that power relationships in society are inextricably bound up with and reproduced through language. 15 9 For
example, Lucie White has explored the ways in which the rules governing the use of speech in legal rituals have functioned, and continue to
function, as gatekeepers which exclude the speech of women and other
subordinate groups. 160 White's meticulous focus on the language used
in the hearing room itself, which demonstrates the ways in which Mrs.
G's speech was literally constrained, vividly illustrated the ways in
which legal discourse operates as an instrument of power to exclude,
silence, and oppress. In contrast to the Translator's promise of empowerment through access to legal discourse, the Shadow focuses on how
legal discourse functions as an instrument of subordination.
A second point of divergence between these models concerns the
157. Id. at 71.
158. Professor Cunningham's client, Dujon Johnson, addressed these comments to him:
You're the kind of person who does the most harm. You have a guardian mentality,
assume that you know the answer. You presume you know the needs and answers.
Oversensitivity. Patronizing. All the power is vested in you. I think you may go
too far, assuming that you know the answer.
Cunningham, supra note 151, at 928.
159. For a more developed discussion of Foucault's idea of "power/knowledge", see infra part
V.
160. White, supra note 19.
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agency of the client. While the Translator assumes that the client is
relatively powerless within the alien language of the legal realm, the
Shadow acknowledges that the client may have a role as a strategist and
manipulator of language that is opaque to the lawyer. The Shadow
acknowledges that the gap between lawyer and client is ultimately
unbridgeable. Only the client can truly formulate and represent her own
interests. This model of lawyering is problematic because it writes the
lawyer out of the script. It is difficult to envision what lawyering would
look like if this radical critique of representation were followed to its
logical endpoint.
The differences between those two models of representation may be
categorized as falling into the hope/humility trajectory.1 61 Although the
Translator preserves the role of the lawyer, the Shadow displaces the
lawyer altogether. The former emphasizes the potential for empowerment by deploying legal discourse on the client's behalf, while the latter
emphasizes the dangers of that course of action. The former stresses the
continuity between lay and legal problem-solving strategies; the latter
stresses the unbridgeable gap between lawyers and clients. The tension
between these models, which is likely to resonate strongly with advocates engaged in the ongoing struggle of representing subordinated people, emerges from the paradoxical nature of legal representation itself.
3.

THE CO-EMINENT COLLABORATOR AND THE HUMBLE HANDMAIDEN

An important and related issue also taken up by the new scholarship is the lawyer's appropriate role in formulating problems, strategies,
and goals for (or with) the client. The models of the "co-eminent Collaborator" and the "humble Handmaiden" offer contrasting views of the
lawyer's role. The Handmaiden adheres to the old-fashioned distinction
between law and politics by maintaining that advocates ought not to
intervene in the "political" decisions of clients.'62 The Collaborator
rejects the idea that lawyers can or should remain independent of their
client's political or moral positions.' 63 While both the Collaborator and
the Handmaiden appreciate the fundamentally unequal distribution of
161. See supra part II.

162. E.g., Bachmann, supra note 84; see also Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty
Law and a Theory ofDialogicEmpowerment, 16 N.Y.U. Rav. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659 (1987-88).

"The poverty lawyer's role in political confrontation is limited.... In no circumstance should she
participate in [direct] action. Nor should she assume the role of political counsel on matters of
tactics and strategy. Rather she should cabin her activities to the ken of legal knowledge." Id. at
709.
163. See LuiAN, supra note 62; Simon, supra note 62, at 1083; see generally Robert W.

Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rav. 1 (1988).
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power in the lawyer/client relationship, they differ on its implications for
the lawyer's role.
The Handmaiden argues that, because the lawyer cannot avoid
unduly influencing her client's decisions, given the ways in which internal and external forms of oppression lend her greater authority and credibility, she should confine her role as much as possible.164 For the
Handmaiden, the possibility that her involvement, however well-intentioned, may function to distort or co-opt the client's political struggle
outweighs her potential to contribute. 165 The Handmaiden believes that
the focus on legal mechanisms and legal fora that occurs when lawyers
take on too large a role in social movements limits their transformative
potential.1 66 In this view, which strongly echoes the position taken by
the previous generation of radical lawyers, 167 it is the social and political
struggles of the poor, rather than the legal16struggles,
that are (and should
8
be) the primary engine of social change.
164. As Lucie White cautioned, the poverty lawyer cannot escape her status as a double agent.
Though the lawyer had worked hard to identify with Mrs. G., she was also sworn,
and paid, to defend the basic constitution of the status quo. When Mrs. G.
"misbehaved" at the hearing, when she failed to talk on cue and then refused to keep
quiet, Mrs.G. pointed to the ambiguity of the legal aid lawyer's social role. Through
her defiant actions, Mrs. G. told the lawyer that a conspiracy with a double agent is
inevitably going to prove an unstable alliance.
White, supra note 19, at 47.
165. White, supra note 128, at 886-87.
In order to negotiate the risks of tailoring-of shaping the law to respond to the
needs of subordinated groups-the power to tailor must shift to those that the
tailoring seeks to help. Those who have been diagnosed as different, as disabled,
must assume the power to describe their own circumstances, discover their own
"capacities," and define their own "needs." The society must free them to locate
their own safe social spaces where they can explore their injuries, feel their own
fluency, and recast their "difference" as the very ground of their power.
Id.
166. White, supra note 147, at 741.
(T]he fundamental problem [with the attempt to use law as a means of resolving
conflict and promoting social justice] is that inherent in this approach is the
acceptance as given of a system of law which may itself be the source of the conflict
and injustice. The result may be that the lawyer ends up unintentionally promoting
the use of the legal system as a means of accommodating the conflict rather than
promoting social justice .... [T]he legal process may obscure the true nature of the
dispute and even obstruct its just resolution.
Id. at 741-42 (quoting G. Budlender, Lawyers, Conflict, and Social Justice (unpublished manuscript on file with Lucie E. White)).
167. E.g., JOEL HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW
REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978).
168. Bachmann, supra note 84.
The primary motor of social change is social struggle, not legal struggle. The
question thus becomes: to what extent can lawyers and the law have an impact in
this "extra-legal" arena? The answer is that lawyers can play meaningful roles in
actual social struggles, though their role relates more to the preconditions for social
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On the other hand, the Collaborator recognizes that the Hand69
maiden may attribute a false essentialism to the client's struggle.'
Recognizing that the client's interests may be too indeterminate and
fluid to play the role assigned to them in more traditional views of representation, the Collaborator seeks to create a "nonhierarchical community
of interest" with his clients. 170 The Collaborator and her client work
together as allies toward the deployment of strategies for the transformative use of law in a common struggle. 71 As collaborators, they must
consider and respect each other's judgements, but must be equally free
to occasionally challenge the views of the other.
The struggle to maintain the balance between respecting the clients'
knowledge and falsely essentializing it is an enduring dilemma of poverty lawyering. That struggle, in part, turns on the belief in a firm law/
politics distinction, which is also a central feature of the tension between
the liberal legalist and radical models contained in the old lawyering
scholarship. The reproduction of this dilemma between the Handmaiden
and Collaborator models within the new scholarship highlights one of
the important points of continuity, as well as one of the enduring paradoxes, of the poverty lawyers' project.
4.

THE FACILITATOR AND THE STRATEGIST

Finally, two models of empowerment are intertwined with each of
the above dualities in the literature. I have dubbed these models the
Facilitator and the Strategist. The Facilitator sees client empowerment
as embedded within the lawyering process itself, by giving the client
power to make decisions about what should be done and to speak out
against injustice. The Strategist views empowerment more instrumentally; it is something that happens when the lawyer/client team is able to
manipulate the legal/political system to obtain advantages for disempowered and subordinated people. The contrasting models of the
Strategist and the Facilitator represent a dichotomy similar to that repremobilization than to substantive issues. The lawyer's role is more the oiler of the
social change machine than its motor; the motor of this machine remains masses of
people. From a democratic perspective, this is the way it should be, and from a

historical perspective, the only way it can be.
Id. at 21.

169. Dinerstein, supra note 130, at 985. "The theoretics movement must also avoid its own
form of essentialism in which poor clients are seen as all-powerful individuals awaiting only their
lawyer's assistance to unleash their potency." Id.
170. William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 469, 485
(1984).

171. For examples of strategies for the transformative use of law, see Gabel & Harris, supra
note 84, and White, supra note 89.
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sented by the law as tool versus law as terrain metaphor. 172 The Strategist views legal knowledge as a thing that can be used by poor
communities to obtain some advantages; the Facilitator views the law as
a thing that has constructed the landscape of power and knowledge to
the disadvantage of certain groups of people.
The model of the lawyer as Facilitator draws upon the critical
pedagogy of Paulo Freire, 173 as well as the feminist methodology of consciousness-raising. 74 Each presents a view of how an active, critical
consciousness can emerge among members of oppressed groups when
they have an opportunity to reflect together, in the right circumstances,
about their individual and collective subordination. The process requires
disempowered individuals to first reclaim a safe space in which they can
come together in a nonhierarchical, small group for discussions. Then,
members of the group share their experiences with each other. Through
the process of sharing and reflecting, an awareness of shared conditions
of oppression emerges. As the group continues to reflect, they are collectively able to identify problems that need to be addressed and to
devise strategies for dealing with them.
The model of the Facilitator purposely does not contain a privileged
leadership role. Lucie White, however, has maintained that the lawyer,
as an outsider, can play a part in this dialogic process of empowerment.
The outsider helps to bring people together, sets a tone in which collective learning can take place, and teaches a practice of critical
reflection by leading the group through its first sessions and helping
it plan its first actions. In contrast to the conventional professional,
however, the outsider-the lawyer working in the third dimensiondoes not5 claim to possess privileged knowledge about politics or
17
reality.
At its most extreme, this model equates the lawyer's role to that of
an organizer, while minimizing or eliminating the need for a reliance on
the lawyer's specialized legal knowledge. One must consider the effects
of this radical abandonment of the lawyer's traditional role on the lawyer's legitimacy and credibility, and consequently her ability to gain
access to communities of disempowered clients. Thus, there may be a
significant downside, both practically as well as conceptually, to this
wholesale retreat from a belief in the utility of specialized legal
1 76
knowledge.
172. See supra part II.
173. PAULO FREIRE & ANTONIO FAUNDEZ, LEARNING TO QUESTION: A PEDAGOGY OF
LIBERATION (1989); PAULO FREiRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1970).
174. Bartlett, supra note 137; Schneider, supra note 140.
175. White, supra note 147, at 762.
176. My own experiences as a participant-observer at a nascent community legal clinic in
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In contrast, the Strategist model affirms the utility of legal knowledge and legal action as one type of social change strategy among
others. Without excluding subordinated groups and communities as
sources of valid knowledge about the circumstances of their struggles,
the Strategist values legal knowledge and strategies for what they may
be able to achieve on behalf of disadvantaged groups. The Strategist
views empowerment as external, rather than intrinsic to the process of
struggle. This view of empowerment is usually linked with a belief in
the possibility of a genuine, nonhierarchial dialogue between lawyer and
client that can give rise to effective collaborations.
For example, Gerald L6pez suggested that both lay and legal understandings of the world, which he views as "continuous practical knowledges," might be usefully and strategically combined to more effectively
achieve goals that one or the other working alone might not have managed as well. L6pez's view is strategic to the extent that he claims that:
appreciating the relationship of lay to legal know-how-and of lay to
professional lawyering-can pay off, even in the short run. Concerned lawyers better the chances of identifying [with both clients
and their allies] what moves would support and not negate potentially
effective lay strategies that have already been put into motion.17 7
L6pez's concern is practical and instrumental. It is focused on moving
the world in a desired direction. L6pez's vision of rebellious lawyering
does not address the concern of Freire, Feminists, and Facilitators that
subordinated groups might first require liberation from forms of internalized oppression to be empowered to struggle against their own subordination. For L6pez, the clients are always already rebellious. It is the
lawyers who need to have their consciousnesses raised.
One can also see the tension between these two approaches in Professor Anthony Alfieri's "theory of dialogic empowerment."' 7 8 Alfieri
speaks of dialogic communities of the subordinated in the Freirian sense,
as well as the "dialogic point of connection" between poverty lawyers
and the poor. His focus on remaking the lawyer's role makes it clear
that Alfieri believes that lawyers can usefully contribute to the poor's
class struggle in some nontrivial way, yet he does not waver from attributing to the poor themselves a role as agents of history.' 79
South Madison attest to this potential downside. See Ruth Buchanan, South Madison's
Community Legal Outreach Clinic: Some Provisional Observations (unpublished manuscript on
file with the author).
177. LOPEZ, supra note 3, at 51 (emphasis added).

178. Alfieri, supra note 162, at 695.
179. Id. at 711 (emphasis added).
Only by redressing this reductionism, restoring the fullness of historical experience,
and recovering the oppositional continuities of alternative traditions, can poverty
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As the above examples illustrate, there is no easy reconciliation of
these two approaches in the new poverty lawyering literature. The contrast between prioritizing empowerment through representation or
through its results reveals yet another basic dilemma at the heart of the
poverty lawyer's project. Like each of the preceding pairs of competing
models, the contradictory nature of the poverty lawyer's attempt to
empower subordinated groups in society cannot be reduced to a single
formula, but must be confronted by the lawyer in the process of the day
to day representation of disadventaged groups and individuals.
C. Recognizing Continuities/NegotiatingDifferences
My analysis of two generations of poverty lawyers gives rise to a
double-edged critique. On one hand, it insists on the social and political
specificity of the task of poverty lawyering and rejects abstract and ahistorical comparisons of various "approaches." On the other hand, it demonstrates a number of dilemmas common to the poverty lawyer's project
and illustrates ways in which each generation has attempted to grapple
with these central paradoxes. My analysis also reveals the divisions and
ambiguities within each of those literatures, and highlights the partial
and incremental nature of poverty law work.
This Article resists simply equating the old scholarship with structural approaches to theory and the new with poststructural. Yet, the significance of some poststructuralist ideas, particularly Foucault's
approach to power, for isolated and disenchanted poverty law scholars in
the 1980s, cannot be overlooked. As Lucie White observed:
Foucault's picture of power disrupts [the] closed circle of domination. By showing that the dominators do not "possess" power, his
picture makes possible a politics of resistance. It opens up space for
a self-directed, democratic politics among subordinated groups, a
politics that is neither vanguard-driven nor coopted, as the politics of
the colonized subject inevitably is. The Foucaultian picture of power
makes insurgent politics interesting again; it brings possibility back
into focus, even in apparently quiescent times when resistance is visible only in the microdynamics of everyday life. 8 °
Critics have argued that the new scholarship has been overly enthusiastic in its embrace of post-structural theorists like Foucault, to the
lawyers facilitate the unification of the poor into a class for itself consciously
striving to remake the oppressive world of poverty. Remaking this world begins
with the transformation of the attorney/client relation, the dialogic point of
connection between poverty lawyers and the poor.
Id.
180. Lucie E. White, Seeking "... the Faces of Otherness ...":A Response to Professors
Sarat, Felstiner, and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1499 (1992).
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detriment of its practical engagement with issues specific to poverty
lawyering. Although the new scholars have selectively drawn from
post-structural theory those elements that have been of use to them in
wrestling with the ongoing dilemmas of poverty lawyering, they have
not always been self-conscious about either the partial nature of their
borrowings, nor their intellectual debt to a previous generation of poverty scholars.
The Foucaultian vision of the potential for social change is much
more bleak than the vision embedded within the new poverty law scholarship. 1' Foucault's view of subjects as constructed by and constrained
within social relations of power severely delimits his views on the possibility for social transformation. He is self-consciously antihumanist and
anti-teleological. While he allows for the possibility of isolated, transitory, and shifting moments of resistance, he does not allow them to be
invested with larger meanings or trajectories.
On the other hand, the new poverty law scholars have focused, at
one level, on resurrecting and reinscribing client narratives into legal
discourse. Although the new scholars found Foucault's ideas about
power invigorating, they have replaced Foucault's antihumanist insurrection with a humanist vision of clients and lawyers who work together
to fundamentally transform their advocacy. The unstated but underlying
premise of the new scholarship is that the transformation of poverty
lawyering, and specifically the relationship between lawyers and clients,
will serve as the political basis for larger social transformations. Unlike
Foucault,' 8 2 the new poverty law scholars are consciously constituting
themselves as engaged social theorists, creating a "theoretics of practice" 18 3 out of their own reflections upon their activist work.
The point at which the work of the new scholars diverges from the
antihumanist implications of Foucault's poststructuralism is also a point
of continuity with the old approaches. Both new and old poverty lawyering scholarship acknowledge the need for broader "theories" of social
change and for faith in the ability of lawyers and clients to make a difference through their own actions. Both the new scholarship and the
older critical perspectives share a countervailing understanding of the
181. Many critics have charged Foucault with failing to provide a "reconstructive" vision.
E.g., TERESA DE LAURETIS, TECHNOLOGIES OF GENDER (1987).
182. Foucault has been described as a thinker who "despite his emphasis on local struggles...
is largely uninterested in local victories". Michael Walzer, The Politics of Michel Foucault
(unpublished lecture, Princeton University, 1982). See also Foucault's comments on his own
involvement in prison reform in France: "The ultimate goal of [our] interventions was not to
extend the visiting rights of prisoners to thirty minutes or to procure flush toilets for the cells, but
to question the social and moral distinction between the innocent and the guilty." MICHEL
FOUCAULT, THE FOUCAULT READER 220 (Paul Rabinow ed. 1984).
183. See Symposium, Theoretics of Practice,supra note 4.
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complexities and contradictions of the lawyer's role in addition to the
shared project of social transformation through law more generally.
Yet, the old and the new scholarship also have a common blindness: the failure to acknowledge directly the paradoxical nature of the
lawyering project. Despite express attempts by some new scholars to
negotiate their way out of these binds, 84 the powerful and polarizing
dichotomies of law and politics, structures and agents, and theory and
practice, underpin the new scholarship as powerfully as they do the old.
One measure of the value of poverty law scholarship is not its ability to
resolve the dilemmas that it identifies, but the degree to which it engages
them. Therefore, my main critique of both the "new" and "old" scholarship is their frequent failure to directly engage the contradictions and
paradoxes of poverty law. 185 While a great deal of valuable work has
been done, neither the "new" scholarship nor the "old" provides a satisfactory foundation for engaging the ongoing dilemmas of the poverty
lawyering project-the task of "living in the contradiction."1 86 In my
final Section, I offer a partial and provisional outline for a reconstructive
theory for poverty lawyering, integrating the insights gained from my
review of the poverty lawyering scholarship with recent developments in
social theory.
V.

POSTSCRIPT

I am sitting in a fashionable restaurant in Washington, D.C.,
with my mentor, a man who has had a long and successful career in
left scholarship. The occasion is my acceptance of a teaching position in a law school. We are discussing a subject we have often
returned to in our three years of work together, the possibility for
transformative politics in one's scholarship. He suggests that the
conditionsfor such scholarshipnow may not be optimal. He is concerned for my future as a legal scholar. When he started out, he
suggests, there was a "culture of rebellion" to support and sustain
his efforts and those of his peers. "No such culture exists now," he
says. "There seem to be no viable alternatives." I am uncomfortable
with his statement and squirm in my chair. Although I recognize the
shift that he has described, I know that there are important differences in how we perceive its implications. I respond by saying, "We
have a different culture now. It is a 'culture of resistance.' " I am
not sure exactly what I mean. He doesn't say anything. When the
waiterpours the wine, we move on to more mundane topics, in tacit
184. Id.
185. Of course, there are some notable exceptions. See, e.g., White, supra note 128.
186. Teresa de Lauretis originated the phrase. DE LAURETIS, supra note 181.
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recognition of both our differences and the ongoing nature of the
conversation.

At stake in this Article's exploration of historical transformations in
poverty lawyering scholarship are issues that go well beyond the concerns of poverty lawyers. Changes in poverty law scholarship and practice have taken place in the context of larger shifts in our understandings
of the nature and conditions of socially-transformative practice. This
Article has examined poverty lawyering as an evolving set of culturally
constitutive practices. One of its aims has been to reveal the extent to
which ideas and categories embedded in the ways that poverty lawyers
approached their work were drawn from and fed back into the social
contexts in which they were located. As the contexts shifted, so did the
practices of poverty lawyers. Yet, at the same time as it makes the case
for the historical specificity of poverty lawyering, my analysis reveals a
persistent set of core dilemmas concerning the nature, range, and tenor
of this project, dilemmas with which all poverty lawyers have to
grapple.
This tension between similarities and differences between two generations of poverty law scholarship is akin to that revealed by my restaurant conversation with my mentor. While we acknowledge and are
connected by our shared concerns, we are divided by a generational shift
in theoretical orientation, between the "culture of rebellion" and the
"culture of resistance." This final Section of the Article examines this
shift in social theory as the deep structure that underlies the current
debates in poverty law scholarship. In doing so, I tentatively outline the
contours of a new understanding of transformative practice: the culture
of resistance. In place of a conclusive set of ideas or prescriptions about
the role of theory in the practice of poverty lawyering, this Postscript is
intended to provide only a preliminary and subjective sketch of some
relatively unexplored theoretical terrain.
The "sea change" in social theory to which I am referring can be
perceived in a shift both in the methods and central concerns of disciplines from sociology to linguistics to anthropology, as well as in the
emergence of cultural studies as a discrete, new discipline. The focus
has moved from institutions to agents, from enduring structures to everyday practices, from rules to strategies. This shift also generated new
ways of envisioning the ongoing constitution and reproduction of social
meanings, relations, and institutions. A key symbol of these new theoretical orientations is the notion of "practice."' 8 7 I use the phrase "prac187. My use of the notion of "practice" to describe a key symbol rather than a coherent
theoretical approach is borrowed from Sherry Ortner, Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties, 26
COMP. STUD. Soc'y & HIST. 126, 127 (1984) ("I will argue that a new key symbol of theoretical
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tice theory" to describe loosely this nexus of theoretical orientations and,
more specifically, to describe the approach that I have assembled from
18 8
ingredients "poached" from various sources.
A.

The Problem of False Antinomies

In the 1960s and 1970s, some social theorists in Europe identified a
new set of problems for social theory, in part as a response to the dueling traditions of structuralist and phenomenological theories. One of the
important issues to emerge at this time was a concern with the persistence of underlying conceptual dualisms or antinomies. Anthony Giddens, for example, has described his "theory of structuration" as a
189
response to "the lack of a theory of action in the social sciences."
Giddens identified an opposition between what he described as "voluntarist" and "determinist" approaches to theory. According to Giddens,
the former fails to adequately attend to the nexus of issues surrounding
"institutional analysis, power, and social change" while the latter largely
ignores the possibility of human agency.1 90 The division of the field
of American sociology into micro (the study of social actors) and macro
(the study of social systems) approaches, while enabling these two
approaches to coexist, does not manage to resolve their basic
incommensurability.
Giddens seeks to connect "a notion of human action with structural
explanation."' 91 In his view, the opposition between voluntarist and
determinist theory is built upon a fundamental problem in the way that
theorists conceptualize structures and agents. This difficulty cannot be
resolved by simply merging the two approaches. For Giddens, both a
new theory of the acting subject that incorporates a notion of "practical
consciousness" and a new theory of social structures as constituted
through social practices are necessary to resituate social theory within
1 92
both time and space.
Bourdieu also describes the field of sociological thought as structured by a series of antagonistic pairs of concepts that are "profoundly
orientation is emerging, which may be labelled 'practice' (or 'action' or 'praxis'). This is neither
a theory nor a method in itself, but rather, as I said, a symbol, in the name of which a variety of
theories and methods are being developed.").
188. "Poaching" is one of the tactics described by De Certeau in his analysis of power and
resistance in everyday life. DE CERTEAU, supra note 16.
189. ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY: ACTION, STRUCTURE AND
CONTRADICTION IN SOCIAL ANALYSIS 2 (1979).
190. Id.
191. Id.at 49.
192. Id.at 3.
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harmful" to social scientific practice. 93 He describes these "false antinomies" as:
paired oppositions [which] construct social reality or more accurately
here, they construct the instruments of the construction of social reality: theories, conceptual schemes, questionnaires, data sets, statistical
techniques, and so on. They define the visible and invisible, the
thinkable and the unthinkable; and like all social categories, they hide
as much as they reveal and can reveal only by hiding. In addition,
these antinomies are at once descriptive and evaluative, one side
always being considered as the "good one", because their
use is
1 94
always rooted in the opposition between "us" and "them.

For Bourdieu, the primary task of theory is to "move beyond the antagonism between these two modes of knowledge, while preserving the gains
from each of them."' 9
The notion that misleading and falsifying oppositions underlay
social and legal theory more recently gained currency in North American critical legal scholarship, which deployed the discovery of these
oppositions as an effective tool for deconstructing traditional categories
of legal thought. 196 Yet, many of the dualisms identified by Bourdieu
197
and Giddens were replicated through divisions among CLS scholars.
It has been suggested that theories of practice could provide a resolution
to this theoretical impasse.1 98 Nevertheless, the persistence of traditional hierarchies in legal scholarship between the study of theory and
practice, coupled with the discipline's preference for mandarin materials, has left the promise of practice theory for legal scholarship largely
unexplored. 199
B.

Overcoming the Theory/PracticeDivide

Practice theory takes as its premise the basic inseparability of the193. Pierre Bourdieu, Vive la Crise! For Heterodoxy in Social Science, 17 THEORY & Soc'Y
773-87 (1988).
194. Id. at 778.
195. PIERu

BouiDIEu,

THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 25 (1990).

196. See sources cited at supra note 123, especially Gary Peller, The Metaphysics ofAmerican
Law.
197. Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
198. Rosemary Coombe, Room for Manoeuvre: Toward a Theory ofPracticein CriticalLegal
Studies, 14 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 69 (1989).
199. The Femcrit and Critical Race Theory strands in legal theory are the most promising in
this regard, as they attempt to negotiate, in different ways, the subjective experiences of
individuals within a racist and sexist social structure. Yet, there has been remarkably little crossfertilization between these literatures and practice theory. One notable' exception is Leslie
McCall, Does Gender Fit? Bourdieu, Feminism and Conceptions of Social Order, 21 THEORY &
Soc'v 837 (1992).
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ory and practice.2 °° Yet, the commonsense notion of theory as separate
from or outside of practice has recently come under attack, not just from
practice theorists, but from thinkers in many different disciplines. The
privileging of abstract, timeless, and disembodied mental work over the
embodied, temporal, and everchanging requirements of everyday practices, like cooking, is deeply implicated in the patriarchal and discriminatory order that has relegated women and other marginalized groups to
the performance of such practical tasks.201 Undermining the hierarchy
between theory and practice has been a particularly central thrust of
feminist theorizing.20 2 Recent developments in cognitive psychology
have underlined the situated and contextual origins of what were once
considered highly abstract and enduring concepts.20 3 Even individuals'
skills in mathematical reasoning have been shown to vary according to
the circumstances.20 4 Scholarly discussions of the reflective and contextual nature of practices as diverse as teaching, cooking, architectural
design, and piano playing serve to undermine the notion that theory, in
an external and objective sense, necessarily guides practice.205
These alternative conceptions suggest that if we want to use the
term "theory" to describe what orders and gives meaning to our practice,
it does not make much sense to think of it as something that we refer to
200.
(1992).

PIERRE BOURDIEU & Loic WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY

160-61

Theory is not a sort of prophetic or programmatic discourse which originates by
dissection or by amalgamation of other theories for the sole purpose of confronting
other such pure "theoreticist theories."... Rather, scientific theory as I construe it
emerges as a program of perception and of action-a scientific habitus if you
wish-which is disclosed only in the empirical work that actualizes it. It is a
temporary construct which take shape for and by empirical work.
Id.
201. Deane Curtin, Food/Body/Person, in COOKING, EATING, THINKING 4 (1992).
There is a dynamic between those who marginalize and those whose lives are
marginalized. . . . In marginalizing the lives of women, manual laborers, and
persons of color (those who have been defined as responsible for food), dominant
persons also marginalize the aspects of their own lives that are "ordinary" and
"bodily." Attention to the experiences of marginalized persons reveals those aspects
of all persons that have been marginalized.
Id.
202. See, e.g., DE LAURETIS, supra note 181. "What I am suggesting is that theory is
dialectically built on, checked against, modified by, transformed along with, practice-that is to
say with what women do, invent, perform, produce, concretely and 'not for all time' but within
specific historical and cultural conditions." Id. at 84.
203.

GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN,

FIRE

AND DANGEROUS THINGS:

WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL

MIND (1987).
204. For example, women who can do complicated mathematical calculations in the grocery
store cannot do much simpler figures abstracted from the demands of their everyday lives.

ABOUT THE

LAKOFF, supra note 203.

205. Several of these examples are explored at some length by
REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER

(1983).

DONALD SCHON, THE
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only in moments of quiet reflection.2" 6 If we begin to think of our theories in a new way, however, as being present in all aspects of our everyday practices, it becomes clear that our theories will not be static.
Rather, the critics suggest, our understandings both of the world and of
our own practices are necessarily partial, shift over time, and may sometimes contradict each other.20 7 As a first step to a reconstructive way of
thinking about social change, it is necessary to reject the commonsense
dichotomy between theory and practice and replace it with a more flexible, strategic, and situated conception of "thoughtful practice. 20 8
C.

Toward a Transformative Theory of Practice

Central to each of the "practice theory" approaches is the notion
that social relations, which inevitably and everywhere involve relations
of power, are constructed and reproduced through the complex minutiae
of everyday practices. 20 9 This also means that changes in practices
might transform social structures and institutionalized power inequities. 210 Thinking about social change in this way, however, first requires
the rejection of dualisms such as the structure/agency divide. As Susan
Silbey observed, "social structure refers to the constraints operating in
situations to channel and limit the play of practice. Structure is not simply inserted into situations, it is constituted through active social practice. 21 Practice is the patterned play of individual agents; it is created
and carried out through the myriad choices of individual actors. Social
206. Gerald L6pez emphasizes this interpenetration of the realms of theory and practice in the
practice of lawyering against subordination. LOPEZ, supra note 3.
Sophie and Amos do not exit the world of theory either when they're consumed
with observing the smallest detail or when they're designing and deploying
strategies to change the world. They could no more operate without theories, large
and small, than they could fiinction without close observation and sensible
strategies.
Id. at 66.
207. Lucie White has expanded on this notion, which she calls "situated theoretical practice" in

Paradox, Piecework and Patience, supra note 21, at 854 ("the slow learning that comes from
multiple, partial perspectives, from uncertain readings by advocates of their own day to day
work").
208. See Lisa Heldke, Foodmaking as Thoughtful Practice in COOKING, EATING, THINKING

(1992).
209. I am using the word "practice" in a very broad sense here, to incorporate all structured
human activity, including discourse. Everyday practices involve activities such as walking or
driving to work, preparing and consuming meals, or decorating one's home or apartment, as well
as public activities such as interacting with others in work settings, shopping, or participating in
cultural events. Of course, what lawyers do (which we ordinarily describe as their "practice") is
also included within this definition.
210. William Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and
Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions,77 CORNELL L. REv. 1447 (1992).
211. Susan Silbey, Making a Placefor CulturalAnalyses ofLaw, 17 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 39, 43

(1992).
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institutions are not abstract entities somehow above or outside the lives
of individuals, but entirely made up of repeated patterns of practice, over
time, and in particular locations.
This way of thinking diverges dramatically from older structural
approaches. Before I outline my views on the transformative potential
of practice theory for poverty lawyering, I must describe briefly three
conceptual building blocks that are necessary to a transformative theory
of practice: the network theory of power, the social constitution of subjectivity, and the essential connection among practice, meaning making,
and power.
1.

THE NETWORK THEORY OF POWER

Power must be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather as
something that only functions in the form of a chain. It is never
localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated
as a commodity or a piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization.... And not only do individuals
circulate between its threads; they are simultaneously undergoing and
exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting target; they are also the elements of its articulation. In other words,
individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application. z12
Among the most significant of the conceptual breaks with the
hegemony of structuralism was Foucault's development of what I call
the "network" theory of power. Instead of thinking of power as a
weapon that someone wields over someone else, Foucault thought of
power as fluid, dynamic, and shifting. In his view, power does not
define relations between individuals, but flows through and constitutes
them as points of its operation. Even relatively powerless individuals
can be the points through which power may operate at any given
moment.
In contrast to what he called the "repressive" hypothesis of power,
Foucault posited a notion of power as a constructive force. He argued
that subjects in society are constituted by the effects of power and are its
points of articulation. He emphasized the basic connection between the
social effects of power and the making of social subjects: "We should
grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects. 213
Hence, Foucault's "network" theory of power led us to examine power
at the level of everyday practices as a force that produces both social
institutions and social subjects.
212. MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE 98 (Colin Gordon ed. & Colin Gordon et al.
trans., 1980).
213. FOUCAULT, supra note 182, at 210.
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THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF SUBJECTS

We should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, really,
of
progressively, and materially constituted through a multiplicity
21 4
organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts.
The ways in which subjects come to be constituted as such in our
society have recently attracted a fair amount of attention from legal
scholars. 215 Having debunked the liberal legalist notion of the autonomous and self-contained individual, critical scholars turned to the more
difficult question of what-if we are not unified, self-knowing,
independent actors-are we? The general answer, although there are
important distinctions within it, is that we are "socially constituted
subjects."
At the most basic level, being socially constituted simply means
that we are essentially social beings. That is, we all "find" ourselves in
the context of a particular set of distinctly social circumstances, a language, a culture, a family, and so on. "The constitutive action in which
the self is already situated is also the field of social interaction in which
the self is always implicated. The self is a process, and culture is us and
our behavior. "216
To posit subjects as being constituted in and through culture is to
reject the notion that the self is essentially unified or unchanging. Societies do not contain unified cultural orders and understandings, but are
sites of conflict and contradiction between numerous competing and
crosscutting discourses, roles, and norms. Social subjects become the
sites for these struggles. Subjects consist of many social roles, utilize
multiple discourses, and may change their subject-positions according to
the circumstances.2 17 Therefore, socially constituted subjects are fragmentary, shifting, and not fully coherent.
Some postmodern theorists stop there. Feminist, race, and other
scholars concerned with marginalized groups, however, attempt to
develop further this notion of the situated subject. Social situated subjects also can be playful, strategic, and creative. 218 Important differences exist between emphasizing the constitution of subjects as merely
the effects of social phenomenon, as do Foucault and some postmodern
214. FOUCAULT, supra note 212, at 97.
215. James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible? The Post-Modern Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U.
COLO. L. REV. 489 (1991); Tom Heller, Structuralism and Critique,36 STAN. L. REv. 127 (1984);
Peller, supra note 13; Steven Winter, On Building Houses: Forward,69 TEX. L. REv. 1595
(1990-91); Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1627 (1990-91).
216. Winter, supra note 215, at 1607.
217. For lovely development of the notion of shifting subject positions, see Maria Lugones,
Playfulness, World-Travelling and Loving Perception,2 HYPATIA (Summer 1987).
218. Id. See also WILLIAMS, supra note 123.
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legal scholars, 219 and seeing them also as creative agents in their own
right. Containing individuals as both acting subjects and the subjects of
and subjected to social constraints, this double-edged idea of subjectivity
is necessary to the transformative potential of the new approach.
3.

POWER/KNOWLEDGE

It's not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power
(which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic,

and cultural, within which it operates at the present time.22°
Foucault's approach to the study of power in society led him to
posit the basic connection between regimes of power and the production
of knowledge, or "truth." He argued that what is considered truth in a
particular society is always the result of a struggle, of relations of power.
Power produces truth, in the same way that it produces subjects. Foucault's approach to examining truth/power regimes was to ask the question, "Who or what has had to be left out in order for this regime to lay
claim to truth?" Because Foucault saw this process of the production of
truth as always involving a struggle, he explained that opposition and
resistance could also always be found where truth was being produced.
His "insurrection of subordinated knowledges" was the idea that these
oppositional discourses should be reinvigorated and allowed to proliferate as a countervailing force against the increasing hegemony of totalizing (scientific) discourses.
While Foucault gave us this basic connection between power and
truth, he did not attribute any role to human agency, either in the construction of these marginalized discourses, or in their resurrection. Foucault's way of thinking of subjects, as exclusively the effects of power,
the points of its articulation, seemed to leave no room for the possibility
of creative manipulation of discourses and practices by those constituted
within them.2 21 Therefore, it is unclear how he imagined the "insurrection" for which he called would come about. For this, we have to look
219. Foucault, supra note 210, at 98.
The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive
atom, a multiple and inert material upon which power comes to fasten or against
which it happens to strike, and in so doing crushes or subdues individuals. In fact, it
is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures,
certain discourses, certain desires come to be identified and constituted as
individuals. The individual, that is, is not the vis-a-vis of power; it is I believe, one
of its prime effects.

Id.
220. Id. at 133.
221. One critique of Foucault along these lines is made by NANCY FRASER, UNRULY
PRAcTICES: POWER, DIscouRsE AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SocIAL THEORY (1989).
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to feminist, critical race, and other theorists, who have devoted considerable time and energy to documenting the ways in which marginalized
groups appropriate the power to constitute meanings from the dominant
culture.
4.

CONSTRAINT VS. POSSIBILITY

While the practice theory approach reflects our experience of both
constraint and independence, limit and possibility, in our socially-situated practice, there are important variations in the implications drawn by
different theorists. I have relied heavily on the work of Michel Foucault
and Pierre Bourdieu in providing the conceptual foundations for a practice theory approach. Yet, neither Foucault nor Bourdieu fully developed the transformative potential of their ideas. Both remain deeply
attached to the conservative aspects of the reproduction of social institutions, erasing almost any possibility for agency on the part of subjects.
While Foucault's network theory of power tells us to look for
resistance wherever there are relations of power, it does not provide any
ways of distinguishing between resistance that is potentially transformative and resistance that serves to reproduce and maintain the status quo.
Similarly, in Bourdieu's twin notions of habitus and field, we see that
the habitus is merely the internalized disposition of the field of struggle
of which the subject is a participant. Subjects only perform that range of
available "plays" or "moves" that their habitus tells them are legitimate.
In this way, the structure of the field is reproduced.
These are not the only readings available on the transformative
potential of practice. Indeed, these frameworks have provoked many
scholars to develop ideas about the transformative potential of everyday
practices.222 These writers, by focusing on what I will call the elements
of "play" in practice (resistance, subversion, and poaching) create more
room for subjects to maneuver in creating and recreating more just
worlds.
D. Resistance and Reappropriationin Everyday Practices
The focus on everyday practice as a site where power, subjectivity,
and meaning come together and are shaped enables a study of the ways
in which "regular folks" remake the "products" of the dominant culture
through consumption. Michel de Certeau carried out one such study.223
De Certeau described the process through which the receivers of cultural
222. James Scott, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FoRMs OF PEASANT RESISTENCE
(1985). For a recent review of this literature, see Sally E. Merry, Resistence and the Cultural
Power of Law, 29 LAW & Soc'Y R. 11 (1994).
223. DE CERTEAU, supra note 16, at xiv.
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products colonize, appropriate, and make those products meaningful in
their own lives as "ways of making do," or bricolage.224 "Users make
[bricolent] innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within
the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own interests
and their own rules. We must determine the225procedures, bases, effects,
and possibilities of this collective activity.
In describing these processes of "making do," De Certeau defined
"tactics" as those strategic actions that take place on a terrain organized
by another.2 2 6 Tactics are the arts of the weak, for whom victories are
always partial and easily reversed. The political edge to De Certeau's
cultural criticism originated in the idea that in and through everyday
practices-ways of walking, dwelling, reading, dressing, and cookingordinary people deploy, play out, and utilize tactics in myriad ways.
"The tactics of consumption, the ingenious ways in which the weak
make use of the strong, thus lend a political dimension to everyday practices. 2 2 7 Cultural consumption is hence understood as an active, productive form of political activity, identity formation, and meaning
constitution.
The transformative implications of this notion extend beyond that
of Foucault's network theory of power, which suggests only that resistance is found wherever there are relations of power. If power and resistance are everywhere, as they are for Foucault, it is difficult to see how
some acts of resistance might contain transformative potential, while
others merely serve to reproduce the status quo. Building upon De
Certeau, we can see how those who resist give meaning to acts of resistance. I argue that the meaning- and subjectivity-constituting aspects of
resistance are essential to the politically transformative potential of the
practice theory approach.
Along this vein, Rosemary Coombe has begun to examine how
marginalized groups, through various means of "consumption" of culture, subvert and appropriate gender roles:
[p]eople continually engage in cultural practices of bricolage-resignifying media meanings, consumer objects, and cultural tests in order
to adapt them to their own interests and make them fulfill their own
purposes. These practices are central to the political practices of
those in marginal or subordinated social groups who forge "subcultures" with resources foraged from the mediascape ....

Subcultural

practices involve improvisational cultural appropriations that affirm
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id.
Id.
"The space of a tactic is the space of the other." Id. at 37.
Id. at xvii.
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Coombe discussed three examples where marginal social groups,
for the purpose of constructing their own nascent social identities,
appropriate. and subvert traditional gender roles as represented in celebrity culture. Those examples are gay male-camp subculture in the preliberation era, lesbian refashioning of pop icons like James Dean, and
most notably middle class women's engagement in reading and writing
Star Trek fanzines. Each of these groups reappropriates and refashions
the celebrity image for a political purpose: to affirm the sexual/cultural
identity of the subordinate social group, which is not affirmed in the
general political/social culture. Coombe argued that these practices are
a necessary and desirable aspect of contemporary democratic politics,
which consist of "multifaceted struggles amongst peoples continually
'22 9
articulating new social identities from discursive resources.
In the following Section, I compare two texts in which, I argue,
women who find themselves in subordinate positions perform meaningful acts of resistance. The first is the character of Tita in Laura
Esquival's popular novel Like Water for Chocolate.2 30 The second is
Mrs G. in Lucie White's article, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival
Skills and Sunday Shoes: Some Notes on the Story of Mrs. G.2 3 1 My
purpose is to illustrate the continuities between cultural appropriations
that occur in the context of everyday life 32 and those that may occur in
the context of lawyer/client representation. Through this juxtaposition, I
hope to open up the space of lawyer/client relations to the creative and
democratizing practices of subversion, appropriation and reimagining.
E.

233
Rebellious Practices in the Kitchen and the Courtroom

The novel, Like Water for Chocolate, tells the story of Tita, the
youngest girl in a Mexican family. Tita is born and raised in the kitchen.
Her story is told through recipes for meals, home remedies, and other
domestic items. In the opening paragraph of the novel, the female narra228. Rosemary Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights, Postmodern Politics,
and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDozo ARTS AND ENT. L.J. 365, 377 (1992).
229. Id. at 395.
230. LAURA ESQUIVEL, LIKE WATER FOR CHOCOLATE: A NOVEL IN MONTHLY INSTALLMENTS,
WITH RECIPES, ROMANCES AND HOME REMEDIES (Carol Christensen & Thomas Christensen trans.,
1992).

231. White, supra note 19.
232. See, e.g., John Fiske, CulturalStudies and the Culture of Everyday Life, in CULTURAL
STUDIES

(Grossberg et al. eds., 1992); COOKING, EATING, THINKING:

TRANSFORMATIVE

PHILOSOPHIES OF FOOD (Curtin & Heldke eds., 1992).

233. I borrow the notion of lawyering as a "rebellious" practice from L6PEZ, supra note 3. I
am using it because I think that the adjective captures well the idea both of resistance and its
transformative potential.
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tor alludes to the common and unhappy status of women as kitchen
workers, and situates herself firmly within that position, through her
description of the ordinary task of chopping onions: "The trouble with
crying over an onion is that once the chopping gets you started and the
tears begin to well up, the next thing you know you just can't stop. I
don't know whether that's ever happened to you, but I have to confess
it's happened to me, many times. 23 4 Symbolically, Tita begins her life
both in tears and in the kitchen, where she "had no need for the usual
2' 3
slap on the bottom, because she was already crying as she emerged. 1
By tradition, the youngest daughter in the family was to remain unmarried in order to care for her mother until she died. When Tita falls in
love with a young man named Pedro, her mother forbids the marriage
and offers her oldest daughter, Rosaurio, to Pedro instead. Out of desire
to be near Tita, Pedro marries Rosaurio, while Tita becomes the head
cook of the family ranch.
While the kitchen is both the site and the symbol of Tita's oppression, it is also the place where she defines herself as a person. Cooking
becomes the mechanism through which she expresses her identity
throughout her life. Foods that Tita makes absorb and convey her inner
psychological states. After Tita cried tears of disappointment into the
batter of Rosaurio's and Pedro's wedding cake, all of the guests who ate
it first experienced a great wave of longing, and then a severe bout of
vomiting. Later, when Pedro brings Tita a bouquet of red roses to celebrate her anniversary as ranch chef, she makes a dish of quail in rose
petal sauce that is so exquisite and sensual that after eating it her sister
runs off with a strange horseman.
The novel's magic realism utilizes the everyday practice of cooking
to embody Tita's inner life. The cooking of food is a practice which
bridges our ordinary distinctions between theory and practice, of "head"
work and "hand" work,23 6 just as the novel breaks down our ordinary
ideas of the distinctions between mind and body, between our thoughts
and feelings and our actions. In Tita's power in the kitchen, we see the
tactics (in De Certeau's sense) of the powerless at work. The kitchen is
not her place, she only occupies it because of her subordinate status, and
she must cook for the others on the ranch. Yet, through techniques of
dissimulation and bricolage (or "making do"), Tita is able to reappropriate the recipes, skills, and tools of her oppressive mother and the
kitchen to forge her own unique identity and ultimately to achieve her
own goals. The book's feminist and political edge comes from its
234. ESQUIVEL, supra note 230, at 3.
235. ESQuIVEL, supra note 230, at 4.
236. Heldke, supra note 208.
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simultaneous identification of the kitchen as the locus of women's
oppression and its powerful celebration as a site of resistance and
empowerment.
In the article, Subordination,Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday
Shoes: Notes on the Hearingof Mrs. G., Lucie White provides a moving account of another woman's acts of resistance and empowerment
through tactics not dissimilar to those deployed by Tita in her kitchen.
Lucie White tells the story from the perspective of the attorney who
takes on the case of Mrs. G.'s overpayment of AFDC benefits. The
lawyer asks for, and gets, a "fair hearing" on the matter of the overpayment, which was the result of an insurance award that she had received
for a small accident. Her welfare officer originally had told her she
could spend the money any way she liked; but later, the file was
reviewed, and she received the overpayment notice. In preparing the
case for the hearing, the lawyer told Mrs. G. about the two "stories" they
could tell to convince the administrator that she should not have to pay
the money back: either her welfare officer gave her wrong advice and
should be estopped from collecting the money now, or Mrs. G. had to
spend the money on necessities to avert a crisis situation in her family.
They decided to go with both stories.
At the hearing, Mrs. G. chose not to recount the estoppel story.
When asked what she had done with the money, she replied firmly and
confidently that she had bought Sunday shoes for her girls. Mrs. G. said
that they already had everyday shoes for school, but they needed new
shoes to go to Church. The lawyer abandoned her necessities argument,
and they lost the hearing. Three days later, the welfare officer called
unexpectedly to tell the lawyer that they had decided to drop the claim
for overpayment. Mrs. G.'s story had worked.
Lucie White recounts, in the balance of the article, both the various
trajectories of disempowerment at work in the hostile environment of the
"fair" hearing, as well as the various tactics employed by Mrs. G. She
went to the lawyer, disregarded her advice, and departed from her given
script to tell a story about Sunday shoes. The terrain of the hearing was
not her own, but by taking all of the prescribed actors by surprise,
including her own lawyer, and using her own abilities to "make do" with
the materials at hand, Mrs. G. was able to prevail. White's observations
about the Sunday shoes story place it squarely within the kinds of cultural and oppositional practices discussed by Coombe and De Certeau.
Subordinated groups must create cultural practices through which
they can elaborate an autonomous, oppositional consciousness.
Without shared rituals for sustaining their survival and motivating
their resistance, subordinated groups run the risk of total domination--of losing the will to use their human powers to subvert the
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oppressors control over them. Religion, spirituality, the social institution of the Black Church, has been one such self-affirming cultural
practice for the communities of African American slaves, and
remains central to the expression of Black identity and group consciousness today. By naming Sunday shoes as a life necessity, Mrs.
G. was speaking to the importance of this cultural practice2 37in her life,
a truth that the system's categories did not comprehend.
In bringing together the stories of Tita and Mrs. G., I hope to illustrate the powerful potential of everyday practices as a site of resistance
and transformation, as well as to make the link between everyday contexts and lawyering practices. Tita's recipes have the same cultural
importance and rebellious potential as Mrs. G.'s Sunday shoes.
Although both are success stories, they occur on uncertain, ambiguous
territory. The victories these women achieve are tenuous, partial, and
subject to reversal or retaliation. Yet, they are victories nonetheless.
These women's stories may well point us in a new theoretical direction
with respect to the transformative possibilities for lawyering practices.
In their own small ways, these stories suggest the larger potential of the
"culture of resistance" to transform the way we think about law, practice, and social change.

237. White, supra note 19, at 48.

